Kant_O_XimPi: janeiro 2009

sábado, janeiro 31, 2009

A Faixa de Gaza é um território que foi tomado dos palestinos pelos israelitas no ano de 1967, na Guerra dos Seis Dias, com o general Moshe Dayan à frente. Sucessivos governos israelenses incentivaram financeiramente colonos a povoar o território a partir da tomada.

Esta pequena faixa territorial a milenios foi dos palestinos e está ao lado do Estado de Israel, como se vê na imagem. Ali, há um milhão de palestinos esperando por ocupar a área, contra 8.000 colonos israelitas que a ocuparam.

Palestinos mulcumanos e judeus brigam pelo território. Por um lado, há a alegação de que o território de Jerusalém, antes dividido ao meio, foi anexado ao Estado de Israel, contra a vontade dos palestinos; por outro, há 22 países árabes no mundo para onde os palestinos poderiam ir.

Este conflito de 22 anos gerou inúmeros atentados terroristas e, em 1993 pelos acordos de estabelecidos na cidade de Oslo (Noruega) , a Organização para a Libertação da Palestina reconheceu o Estado de Israel, que por sua vez, começou a devolver parte dos territórios a então recém criada ( por Yasser Arafat em 18 de Novembro de 1993) a Autoridade Palestina. Ariel Sharon colocou este acordo estagnado, em marcha, somente agora em 2004, retirando tropas israelitas e devolvendo a faixa de Gaza aos palestinos.

Apesar da sofrida desocupação dos israelitas, as autoridades de ambas as partes esperam ter iniciado um processo de paz.

O drama da situação é que o causador de tudo isto, Ariel Sharon, que de benfeitor passou a ser visto como traidor. Tanto os colonos retirados como os soldados que cumprem a ordem de comando para desocupar o território, estão com dificuldade de “entender” e superar as emoções envolvidas nesta estratégia, onde todos esperam não ser apenas um recuo tático, mas um verdadeiro projeto de paz.

Matéria publicada em agosto de 2009

Regina Braga

Era de Aquário

Ibrahemm Abu Mustafa/Reuters

Ataque a Gaza

Fazem 18 dias que Israel bombardeou GAza. Neste período morreram quase mil palestinos, sendo 400 o número entre mulheres e crianças, do lado contrário, 13 israelenses, sendo 3 civis e os demais soldados. Israel atacou no dia 03 de Janeiro de 2009, e o fato de ter iniciado o combate num Sábado, dia do Sabbah, extremamente respeito pelos judeus que vivem em Israel, não tenha sido uma boa estratégia, mas um mau agouro. Isso me causou estranheza, pois eu jamais imaginaria que o ataque de Israel se iniciaria num Sábado. Jamais! Justamente por ter conhecido Israel em Fevereiro de 2008 e ter passado 2 sábados lá. Jamais vou esquecê-los por ser diferente do que em qualquer outro lugar do planeta. Ninguém sai à rua para comprar algo ou por lazer, os israelenses, na maioria ortodoxos, não ascendem luz, não chamam elevador, não lavam louça, não fazem NADA. Só Lêem a Bíblia (Velho Testamento). E, se são tão ortodoxos, não deveria ter sido bom atacar neste dia. Quando se acredita numa coisa, com muitas pessoas ao mesmo tempo, como é o caso, gera-se uma energia favorável a aquilo a que se propõe com toda a devoção, e ...depois se faz o oposto, se iniciando uma GUERRA, acho que dará.....

Bem, impressões pessoais de lado, como todo mundo sabe que Mahatmma Gandhi disse: “Nenhum caminho leva a paz, pois a Paz é o caminho!”

O Hamas precisa ser destruído, está certo. Mas, se o exército de Israel possui o sistema de espionagem mais bem preparado do mundo, por que não caçam os seus mandatários? Atacar, matar, invadir um povo que nem pais têm, numa desproporção muito grande entre as partes, me parece ser uma tática estúpida e provocativa. O mundo todo assiste aos bombardeios que estão ocorrendo em Gaza e protestam a favor dos palestinos. Justifica-se que os palestinos não param de jogar bombas, e que já atiraram 8.000 bombas, mas são bombas de pequeno porte, fazem uma perfuração de 30 cm no solo, bem diferentes das jogadas por Israel.

Conheci a Palestina também em fevereiro de 2008, juntamente com Israel e Jordânia. Na Palestina não há trabalho, apenas uns carros velhos que servem de táxi. Não tem restaurante, hotel, parece cidade de faroeste, é para passar o dia, apenas. Israel parece um Estado americano, pois seu grande mantenedor são os ricos judeus que moram em Nova York e querem ter uma pátria, mas não querem morar lá. Jerusalém parece uma bomba relógio, prestes a explodir a qualquer momento. Estão na defensiva, se protegendo de qualquer ataque, mas há algo errado, há muita dor, muito ódio, muita vontade de brigar. O que vi lá e anotei, me foi tirado.Era a minha caderneta de anotações, guardada dentro de minha bolsa e vista ao passar no visor do aeroporto da Jordânia para entrar em Israel .Identificada como anotações sobre o país, foi literalmente retirada. É humilhante, afinal o que há tanto a se esconder assim? Defender o mundo do mundo?

Israel, usem pra valer sua alta tecnologia e cacem os inimigos, mas não provoquem o ódio naqueles que poderão se tornar seus inimigos em potencial, os suicidas mártires! Ajudar o outro é ajudar a si mesmo. Amar o outro, é conseguir alcançar a capacidade de amar a si próprio.O problema lá, não é apenas político e militar. É HUMANO!!! Os homens não estão agindo com senso e inteligência, e sim como cegos que carregam explosivos. Isso não é bom! Estupidez humana gera morte do amor, trazendo dor e trevas. Não pensem que só vocês têm inimigos. Todos os têm. A sabedoria está em saber conviver com eles. A Paz é um presente que nos foi dado. Não pode ser algo a ser conquistado. Já nos é de direito. Não tire esse direito de ninguém. O nosso dever como humanos é preservá-lo, sempre! Por mais difícil que possa parecer.

Matéria publicada dia 14 de Janeiro de 2009

Era de Aquário
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http://www.eradeaquario.com.br/secao.asp?idMenu=63&idSubMenu=216&idSubSubMenu=263
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sexta-feira, janeiro 30, 2009

O assassin atode Che Guvara pelo «amigo» ammericani

The Death of Che Guevara: Declassified

by Peter Kornbluh

	On October 9th, 1967, Ernesto "Che" Guevara was put to death by Bolivian soldiers, trained, equipped and guided by U.S. Green Beret and CIA operatives. His execution remains a historic and controversial event; and thirty years later, the circumstances of his guerrilla foray into Bolivia, his capture, killing, and burial are still the subject of intense public interest and discussion around the world. As part of the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Che Guevara, the National Security Archive's Cuba Documentation Project is posting a selection of key CIA, State Department, and Pentagon documentation relating to Guevara and his death. This electronic documents book is compiled from declassified records obtained by the National Security Archive, and by authors of two new books on Guevara: Jorge Castañeda's Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (Knopf), and Henry Butterfield Ryan's The Fall of Che Guevara (Oxford University Press). The selected documents, presented in order of the events they depict, provide only a partial picture of U.S. intelligence and military assessments, reports and extensive operations to track and "destroy" Che Guevara's guerrillas in Bolivia; thousands of CIA and military records on Guevara remain classified. But they do offer significant and valuable information on the high-level U.S. interest in tracking his revolutionary activities, and U.S. and Bolivian actions leading up to his death. Contents: Declassified Documents The Death of Che Guevara: A Chronology New Books on Che Guevara (further information)

On October 9th, 1967, Ernesto "Che" Guevara was put to death by Bolivian soldiers, trained, equipped and guided by U.S. Green Beret and CIA operatives. His execution remains a historic and controversial event; and thirty years later, the circumstances of his guerrilla foray into Bolivia, his capture, killing, and burial are still the subject of intense public interest and discussion around the world.

As part of the thirtieth anniversary of the death of Che Guevara, the National Security Archive's Cuba Documentation Project is posting a selection of key CIA, State Department, and Pentagon documentation relating to Guevara and his death. This electronic documents book is compiled from declassified records obtained by the National Security Archive, and by authors of two new books on Guevara: Jorge Castañeda's Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (Knopf), and Henry Butterfield Ryan's The Fall of Che Guevara (Oxford University Press). The selected documents, presented in order of the events they depict, provide only a partial picture of U.S. intelligence and military assessments, reports and extensive operations to track and "destroy" Che Guevara's guerrillas in Bolivia; thousands of CIA and military records on Guevara remain classified. But they do offer significant and valuable information on the high-level U.S. interest in tracking his revolutionary activities, and U.S. and Bolivian actions leading up to his death.

	DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS Click on the document icon to view each document. in http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB5/index.html *CIA, The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban Revolution, October 18, 1965: This intelligence memorandum, written by a young CIA analyst, Brian Latell, presents an assessment that Guevara's preeminence as a leader of the Cuban revolution has waned, and his internal and international policies have been abandoned. In domestic policy, his economic strategy of rapid industrialization has "brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power," the paper argues. In foreign policy, he "never wavered from his firm revolutionary stand, even as other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the revolution." With Guevara no longer in Cuba, the CIA's assessment concludes, "there is no doubt that Castro's more cautious position on exporting revolution, as well as his different economic approach, led to Che's downfall." U.S. Army, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Activation, Organization and Training of the 2d Battalion - Bolivian Army*, April 28, 1967: This memorandum of understanding, written by the head of the U.S. MILGP (Military Group) in Bolivia and signed by the commander of the Bolivian armed forces, created the Second Ranger Battalion to pursue Che Guevara's guerrilla band. The agreement specifies the mission of a sixteen-member Green Beret team of U.S. special forces, drawn from the 8th Special Forces division of the U.S. Army Forces at Southcom in Panama, to "produce a rapid reaction force capable of counterinsurgency operations and skilled to the degree that four months of intensive training can be absorbed by the personnel presented by the Bolivian Armed Forces." In October, the 2nd Battalion, aided by U.S. military and CIA personnel, did engage and capture Che Guevara's small band of rebels. White House Memorandum, May 11, 1967: This short memo to President Lyndon Johnson records U.S. efforts to track Guevara's movements, and keep the President informed of his whereabouts. Written by presidential advisor, Walt Rostow, the memo reports that Guevara may be "operational" and not dead as the CIA apparently believed after his disappearance from Cuba. CIA, Intelligence Information Cable, October 17, 1967: This CIA cable summarizes intelligence, gathered from September 1966 through June 1967, on the disagreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba over Che Guevara's mission to Bolivia. The cable provides specific information on Leonid Brezhnev's objections to "the dispatch of Ernesto Che Guevara to Bolivia" and Brezhnev's decision to send the Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin's visit to Cuba in June, 1967 to discuss the Kremlin's opposition with Castro. CIA sources reported that Kosygin accused Castro of "harming the communist cause through his sponsorship of guerrilla activity...and through providing support to various anti-government groups, which although they claimed to be 'socialist' or communist, were engaged in disputes with the 'legitimate' Latin American communist parties...favored by the USSR." In replying Castro stated that Cuba would support the "right of every Latin American to contribute to the liberation of his country." Castro also "accused the USSR of having turned its back upon its own revolutionary tradition and of having moved to a point where it would refuse to support any revolutionary movement unless the actions of the latter contributed to the achievement of Soviet objectives...." White House Memorandum, October 9, 1967: Walt Rostow reports in this memorandum to President Johnson that unconfirmed information suggests that the Bolivian battalion--"the one we have been training"--"got Che Guevara." White House Memorandum, October 10, 1967: In a short update to Walt Rostow, William Bowdler reports there is still uncertainty about whether Che Guevara was "among the casualties of the October 8 engagement." White House Memorandum, October 11, 1967: In another daily update, Walt Rostow reports to President Johnson that "we are 99% sure that 'Che' Guevara is dead." Rostow believes the decision to execute Guevara "is stupid," but he also points out his death "shows the soundness of our 'preventive medicine' assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency--it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him and got him." White House Memorandum, October 13, 1967: In a final update, Walt Rostow informs Lyndon Johnson that the White House has intelligence information--still censored--that "removes any doubt that 'Che' Guevara is dead." CIA Debriefing of Félix Rodríguez, June 3, 1975 When Che Guevara was executed in La Higuera, one CIA official was present--a Cuban-American operative named Félix Rodríguez. Rodríguez, who used the codename "Félix Ramos" in Bolivia and posed as a Bolivian military officer, was secretly debriefed on his role by the CIA's office of the Inspector General in June, 1975. (At the time the CIA was the focus of a major Congressional investigation into its assassination operations against foreign leaders.) In this debriefing--discovered in a declassified file marked 'Félix Rodríguez' by journalist David Corn--Rodríguez recounts the details of his mission to Bolivia where the CIA sent him, and another Cuban-American agent, Gustavo Villoldo, to assist the capture of Guevara and destruction of his guerrilla band. Rodríguez and Villoldo became part of a CIA task force in Bolivia that included the case officer for the operation, "Jim", another Cuban American, Mario Osiris Riveron, and two agents in charge of communications in Santa Clara. Rodríguez emerged as the most important member of the group; after a lengthy interrogation of one captured guerrilla, he was instrumental in focusing the efforts to the 2nd Ranger Battalion focus on the Villagrande region where he believed Guevara's rebels were operating. Although he apparently was under CIA instructions to "do everything possible to keep him alive," Rodríguez transmitted the order to execute Guevara from the Bolivian High Command to the soldiers at La Higueras--he also directed them not to shoot Guevara in the face so that his wounds would appear to be combat-related--and personally informed Che that he would be killed. After the execution, Rodríguez took Che's Rolex watch, often proudly showing it to reporters during the ensuing years. State Department Cable, Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara, October 18, 1967: Ten days after his capture, U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, Douglas Henderson, transmitted confirmation of Guevara's death to Washington. The evidence included autopsy reports, and fingerprint analysis conducted by Argentine police officials on Che's amputated hands. (Che's hands were cut off to provide proof that he was actually dead; under the supervision of CIA agent Gustavo Villoldo, his body was then secretly buried by at a desolate airstrip at Villagrande where it was only discovered in June 1997.) The various death documents, notes Ambassador Henderson, leave "unsaid the time of death"--"an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours." Southern Command, Activities of the 2nd Ranger Battalion and Death of Che Guevara: The U.S. Special Forces Group, which trained the Bolivan military units that captured Che Guevara, conducted an extensive debriefing of members of the 2nd Ranger Battalion. This report, based on interviews by a member of the U.S. Mobile Training Team in Bolivia with key Bolivian commanders, documents the military movements, and engagement with Che Guevara's guerrilla band. The sources also provide key details and descriptions of his capture, interrogation and execution, although it makes no mention of the CIA official, Félix Rodríguez, who was present. Guevara's last words to the soldier who shot him are reported as: "Know this now, you are killing a man." *Department of State, Guevara's Death--The Meaning for Latin America, October 12, 1967:* In this interpretive report for Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Thomas Hughes, the Latin America specialist at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, summarizes the importance of "the defeat of the foremost tactician of the Cuban revolutionary strategy." The analyst predicts that Guevara "will be eulogized as the model revolutionary who met a heroic death." The circumstances of his failure in Bolivia, however, will strengthen the position of "peaceful line" communist party groups in the Hemisphere. Castro, he argues, will be subject to "we told you so" criticism from older leftist parties, but his "spell on the more youthful elements in the hemisphere will not be broken." The analysis fails to incorporate evidence of the disagreement between Castro and Guevara on the prospects for revolution in Latin America, or the Soviet pressure on Cuba to reduce support for insurgent movements in the Hemisphere. *CIA, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Fidel Castro Delivers Eulogy on Che Guevara, October 19, 1967:* On October 18, 1967, the third day of national mourning, Fidel Castro delivered a eulogy to a crowd of almost one million at the Plaza de La Revolución in Havana. The next day, the speech is transcribed and distributed by FBIS, a CIA transcription agency that records, and translates news and television from around the world. Calling Guevara "an artist of revolutionary warfare," Castro warns that "they who sing victory" over his death--a reference to the U.S.--" are mistaken. They are mistaken who believe that his death is the defeat of his ideas, the defeat of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts." This speech contributes immeasurably to the making of the revolutionary icon that Che Guevara became in the ensuing years. "If we want to know how we want our children to be," Castro concludes, "we should say, with all our revolutionary mind and heart: We want them to be like Che." THE DEATH OF CHE GUEVARA: A CHRONOLOGY Compiled by: Paola Evans, Kim Healey, Peter Kornbluh, Ramón Cruz and Hannah Elinson OCTOBER 3, 1965: In a public speech, Fidel Castro reads a "Farewell" letter written by Che in April, in which Che resigns from all of his official positions within the Cuban government. The letter, which Che apparently never intended to be made public, states that "I have fulfilled the part of my duty that tied me to the Cuban revolution...and I say goodbye to you, to the comrades, to your people, who are now mine." (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Castro and Communism: The Cuban Revolution in Perspective," 5/9/66) OCTOBER 18, 1965: A CIA Intelligence Memorandum discusses what analysts perceive as Che Guevara’s fall from power within the Cuban government beginning in 1964. It states that at the end of 1963, Guevara’s plan of "rapid industrialization and centralization during the first years of the Revolution brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power." "Guevara’s outlook, which approximated present -day Chinese--rather than Soviet--economic practice, was behind the controversy." In July 1964, "two important cabinet appointments signaled the power struggle over internal economic policy which culminated in Guevara’s elimination." Another conflict was that Guevara wanted to export the Cuban Revolution to different parts of Latin America and Africa, while "other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the Revolution." In December, 1964, Guevara departed on a three-month trip to the United States, Africa, and China. When he returned, according to the CIA report, his economic and foreign policies were in disfavor and he left to start revolutionary struggles in other parts of the world. (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban Revolution," 10/18/65) FALL, 1966: Che Guevara arrives in Bolivia sometime between the second week of September and the first of November of 1966, according to different sources. He enters the country with forged Uruguayan passports to organize and lead a communist guerrilla movement. Che chooses Bolivia as the revolutionary base for various reasons. First, Bolivia is of lower priority than Caribbean Basin countries to US security interests and poses a less immediate threat, "... the Yanquis wouldn’t concern themselves... ." Second, Bolivia’s social conditions and poverty are such that Bolivia is considered susceptible to revolutionary ideology. Finally, Bolivia shares a border with five other countries, which would allow the revolution to spread easily if the guerrillas are successful. (Harris, 60, 73; Rojo 193-194; Rodríguez:1, 157;Rodríguez:1, 198) SPRING, 1967: From March to August of 1967, Che Guevara and his guerrilla band strike "pretty much at will" against the Bolivian Armed Forces, which totals about twenty thousand men. The guerrillas lose only one man compared to 30 of the Bolivians during these six months. (James, 250, NYT 9/16/67) APRIL 28, 1967: General Ovando, of the Bolivian Armed Forces, and the U.S. Army Section signed a Memorandum of Understanding with regard to the 2nd Ranger Battalion of the Bolivian Army "which clearly defines the terms of U.S.-Bolivian Armed Forces cooperation in the activation, organization, and training of this unit." MAY 11, 1967: Walt Rostow, presidential advisor to Lyndon B. Johnson, sends a message to the President saying that he received the first credible report that "Che" Guevara is alive and operating in South America, although more evidence is needed. (Rostow 05/11/67) JUNE, 1967: Cuban-American CIA agent Félix Rodríguez receives a phone call from a CIA officer, Larry S., who proposes a special assignment for him in South America in which he will use his skills in unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla operations and communications. The assignment is to assist the Bolivians in tracking down and capturing Che Guevara and his band. His partner will be "Eduardo González" and Rodríguez is to use the cover name "Félix Ramos Medina." (Rodríguez:1, 148) JUNE 26-30, 1967: Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin visits Cuba for discussions with Fidel Castro. According to a CIA intelligence cable, the primary purpose of his "trip to Havana June 26-30, 1967 was to inform Castro concerning the Middle East Crisis...A secondary but important reason for the trip was to discuss with Castro the subject of Cuban revolutionary activity in Latin America." The Soviet Premier criticizes the dispatch of Che Guevara to Bolivia and accuses Castro of "harming the communist cause through his sponsorship of guerrilla activity...and through providing support to various anti-government groups, which although they claimed to be "socialist" or communist, were engaged in disputes with the "legitimate" Latin American communist parties, those favored by the USSR." In reply Castro stated that Cuba will support the "right of every Latin American to contribute to the liberation of his country." (CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 10/17/67) AUGUST 2, 1967: Rodríguez and González arrive in La Paz, Bolivia. They are met by their case officer, Jim, another CIA agent, and a Bolivian immigration officer. The CIA station in La Paz is run by John Tilton; eventually the CIA’s Guevara task force is joined by another anti-Castro Cuban-American agent, Gustavo Villoldo. (Rodríguez:1, 162) AUGUST 31, 1967: The Bolivian army scores its first victory against the guerrillas, wiping out one-third of Che’s men. José Castillo Chávez, also known as Paco, is captured and the guerrillas are forced to retreat. Che’s health begins to deteriorate. (James, 250, 269) SEPTEMBER 3, 1967: Félix Rodríguez flies with Major Arnaldo Saucedo from Santa Cruz to Vallegrande to interrogate Paco. (Rodríguez: 1, 167) SEPTEMBER 15, 1967: The Bolivian Government air-drops leaflets offering a $4,200 reward for the capture of Che Guevara. (NYT 9/16/67) SEPTEMBER 18, 1967: Fifteen members of a Communist group, who were providing supplies to the guerrillas in the southeastern jungles of Bolivia, are arrested. (NYT 9/19/67) SEPTEMBER 22, 1967: Che’s guerrillas arrive at Alto Seco village in Bolivia. Inti Peredo, a Bolivian guerrilla, gives the villagers a lecture on the objectives of the guerrilla movement. The group leaves later that night after purchasing a large amount of food. (Harris, 123) According to Jon Lee Anderson’s account, Che takes the food from a grocery store without paying for it after discovering that the local authorities in Alto Seco have left to inform the army about the guerrilla’s position. (Anderson, 785) SEPTEMBER 22, 1967: Guevara Arze, the Bolivian Foreign Minister, provides evidence to the Organization of American States to prove that Che Guevara is indeed leading the guerrilla operations in Bolivia. Excerpts taken from captured documents, including comparisons of handwriting, fingerprints and photographs, suggests that the guerrillas are comprised of Cubans, Peruvians, Argentineans and Bolivians. The foreign minister’s presentation draws a loud applause from the Bolivian audience, and he gives his assurance that "we’re not going to let anybody steal our country away from us. Nobody, at any time." (NYT 9/23/67) SEPTEMBER 24, 1967: Che and his men arrive, exhausted and sick, at Loma Larga, a ranch close to Alto Seco. All but one of the peasants flee upon their arrival. (Harris, 123) SEPTEMBER 26, 1967: The guerrillas move to the village of La Higuera and immediately notice that all the men are gone. The villagers have previously been warned that the guerrillas are in the area and they should send any information on them to Vallegrande. The remaining villagers tell the guerrillas that most of the people are at a celebration in a neighboring town called Jahue. (Harris, 123) 1 p.m.: As they are about to depart for Jahue, the rebels hear shots coming from the road and are forced to stay in the village and defend themselves. Three guerrillas are killed in the gun battle: Roberto (Coco) Peredo, a Bolivian guerrilla leader who was one of Che’s most important men; "Antonio," believed to be Cuban; and "Julio," likely a Bolivian. Che orders his men to evacuate the village along a road leading to Rio Grande. The army high command and the Barriento government consider this encounter a significant victory. Indeed, Che notes in his diary that La Higuera has caused great losses for him in respect to his rebel cell. (Harris 123,124; NYT 9/28/67)) CIA agent, Félix Rodríguez, under the alias, "Captain Ramos," urges Colonel Zenteno to move his Rangers battalion from La Esperanza headquarters to Vallegrande. The death of Antonio, the vanguard commander [also called Miguel by Rodríguez], prompts Rodríguez to conclude that Che must be close by. Colonel Zenteno argues that the battalion has not yet finished their training, but he will move them as soon as this training is complete. Convinced that he knows Che’s next move, Rodríguez continues pressuring Zenteno to order the 2nd Ranger battalion into combat. (Rodríguez:1, 184) SEPTEMBER 26-27, 1967: After the battle of La Higueras, the Ranger Battalion sets up a screening force along the river San Antonio to prevent exfiltration of the guerrilla force. During the mission, the troops captures a guerrilla known as "Gamba." He appears to be in poor health and is poorly clothed. This produces an immediate morale effect on the troops because they notice that the guerrillas are not as strong as they thought. "Gamba" says that he had separated from the group and was traveling in hope of contacting "Ramón" (Guevara). (Dept. of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67). SEPTEMBER 29, 1967: Colonel Zenteno is finally persuaded by Rodríguez, and he moves the 2nd Ranger battalion to Vallegrande. Rodríguez joins these six hundred and fifty men who have been trained by U.S. Special Forces Major "Pappy" Shelton. (Rodríguez:1, 184) SEPTEMBER 30, 1967: Che and his group are trapped by the army in a jungle canyon in Valle Serrano, south of the Grande River. (NYT 10/1/67) OCTOBER 7, 1967: The last entry in Che’s diary is recorded exactly eleven months since the inauguration of the guerrilla movement. The guerrillas run into an old woman herding goats. They ask her if there are soldiers in the area but are unable to get any reliable information. Scared that she will report them, they pay her 50 pesos to keep quiet. In Che’s diary it is noted that he has "little hope" that she will do so. (Harris, 126; CIA Weekly Review, "The Che Guevara Diary," 12/15/67) Evening: Che and his men stop to rest in a ravine in Quebrada del Yuro. (Harris, 126) OCTOBER 8, 1967: The troops receive information that there is a band of 17 guerrillas in the Churro Ravine. They enter the area and encounters a group of 6 to 8 guerrillas, opens fire, and killed two Cubans, "Antonio" and "Orturo." "Ramon" (Guevara) and "Willy" try to break out in the direction of the mortar section, where Guevara is wounded in the lower calf. (Dept. of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67) OCTOBER 8, 1967: A peasant women alerts the army that she heard voices along the banks of the Yuro close to the spot where it runs along the San Antonio river. It is unknown whether it is the same peasant woman that the guerrillas ran into previously. (Rojo 218) By morning, several companies of Bolivian Rangers are deployed through the area that Guevara’s Guerrillas are in. They take up positions in the same ravine as the guerrillas in Quebrada del Yuro. (Harris,126) About 12 p.m.: A unit from General Prado’s company, all recent graduates of the U.S. Army Special Forces training camp, confronts the guerrillas, killing two soldiers and wounding many others. (Harris, 127) 1:30 p.m.: Che’s final battle commences in Quebrada del Yuro. Simon Cuba (Willy) Sarabia, a Bolivian miner, leads the rebel group. Che is behind him and is shot in the leg several times. Sarabia picks up Che and tries to carry him away from the line of fire. The firing starts again and Che’s beret is knocked off. Sarabia sits Che on the ground so he can return the fire. Encircled at less than ten yards distance, the Rangers concentrate their fire on him, riddling him with bullets. Che attempts to keep firing, but cannot keep his gun up with only one arm. He is hit again on his right leg, his gun is knocked out of his hand and his right forearm is pierced. As soldiers approach Che he shouts, "Do not shoot! I am Che Guevara and worth more to you alive than dead." The battle ends at approximately 3:30 p.m. Che is taken prisoner. (Rojo, 219; James, 14) Other sources claim that Sarabia is captured alive and at about 4 p.m. he and Che are brought before Captain Prado. Captain Prado orders his radio operator to signal the divisional headquarters in Vallegrande informing them that Che is captured. The coded message sent is "Hello Saturno, we have Papá !" Saturno is the code for Colonel Joaquin Zenteno, commandant of the Eighth Bolivian Army Division, and Papá is code for Che. In disbelief, Colonel Zenteno asks Capt. Prado to confirm the message. With confirmation, "general euphoria" erupts among the divisional headquarters staff. Colonel Zenteno radios Capt. Prado and tells him to immediately transfer Che and any other prisoners to La Higuera. (Harris, 127) In Vallegrande, Félix Rodríguez receives the message over the radio: "Papá cansado," which means "Dad is tired." Papá is the code for foreigner, implying Che. Tired signifies captured or wounded. (Rodríguez:1, 185) Stretched out on a blanket, Che is carried by four soldiers to La Higuera, seven kilometers away. Sarabia is forced to walk behind with his hands tied against his back. Just after dark the group arrives in La Higuera and both Che and Sarabia are put into the one-room schoolhouse. Later that night, five more guerrillas are brought in. (Harris, 127) Official army dispatches falsely report that Che is killed in the clash in southeastern Bolivia, and other official reports confirm the killing of Che and state that the Bolivian army has his body. However, the army high command does not confirm this report. (NYT 10/10/67) OCTOBER 9, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a memorandum to the President with tentative information that the Bolivians have captured Che Guevara. The Bolivian unit engaged in the operation was the one that had been trained by the U.S. (Rostow 10/9/67) OCTOBER 9, 1967: 6:15 a.m.: Félix Rodríguez arrives by helicopter in La Higuera, along with Colonel Joaquín Zenteno Anaya. Rodríguez brings a powerful portable field radio and a camera with a special four-footed stand used to photograph documents. He quietly observes the scene in the schoolhouse, and records what he sees, finding the situation "gruesome" with Che lying in dirt, his arms tied behind his back and his feet bound together, next to the bodies of his friends. He looks "like a piece of trash" with matted hair, torn clothes, and wearing only pieces of leather on his feet for shoes. In one interview, Rodríguez states that, " I had mixed emotions when I first arrived there. Here was the man who had assassinated many of my countrymen. And nevertheless, when I saw him, the way he looked....I felt really sorry for him." (Rodríguez:2) Rodríguez sets up his radio and transmits a coded message to the CIA station in either Peru or Brazil to be retransmitted to Langley headquarters. Rodríguez also starts to photograph Che’s diary and other captured documents. Later, Rodríguez spends time talking with Che and takes a picture with him. The photos that Rodríguez takes are preserved by the CIA. (Anderson, 793; Rodríguez:1, 193) 10 am: The Bolivian officers are faced with the question of what to do with Che. The possibility of prosecuting him is ruled out because a trial would focus world attention on him and could generate sympathetic propaganda for Che and for Cuba. It is concluded that Che must be executed immediately, but it is agreed upon that the official story will be that he died from wounds received in battle. Félix Rodríguez receives a call from Vallegrande and is ordered by the Superior Command to conduct Operation Five Hundred and Six Hundred. Five hundred is the Bolivian code for Che and six hundred is the order to kill him. Rodríguez informs Colonel Zenteno of the order, but also tells him that the U.S. government has instructed him to keep Che alive at all costs. The CIA and the U.S. government have arranged helicopters and airplanes to take Che to Panama for interrogation. However, Colonel Zenteno says he must obey his own orders and Rodríguez decides, "to let history take its course," and to leave the matter in the hands of the Bolivians. (Anderson, 795; Harris 128, 129; Rodríguez:1, 193; Rodríguez:2) Rodríguez realizes that he cannot stall any longer when a school teacher informs him that she has heard a news report on Che’s death on her radio. Rodríguez enters the schoolhouse to tell Che of the orders from the Bolivian high command. Che understands and says, "It is better like this ... I never should have been captured alive." Che gives Rodríguez a message for his wife and for Fidel, they embrace and Rodríguez leaves the room. (Rodríguez:2; Anderson, 796) According to one source, the top ranking officers in La Higuera instruct the noncommissioned officers to carry out the order and straws are drawn to determine who will execute Che. Just before noon, having drawn the shortest straw, Sergeant Jaime Terán goes to the schoolhouse to execute Che. Terán finds Che propped up against the wall and Che asks him to wait a moment until he stands up. Terán is frightened, runs away and is ordered back by Colonel Selich and Colonel Zenteno. "Still trembling" he returns to the schoolhouse and without looking at Che’s face he fires into his chest and side. Several soldiers, also wanting to shoot Che, enter the room and shoot him. (Harris, 129) Félix Rodríguez has stated that, "I told the Sargento to shoot....and I understand that he borrowed an M-2 carbine from a Lt. Pérez who was in the area." Rodríguez places the time of the shooting at 1:10 p.m. Bolivian time. (Rodríguez:2) In Jon Lee Anderson’s account, Sergeant Terán volunteers to shoot Che. Che's last words, which are addressed to Terán, are "I know you've come to kill me. Shoot, you are only going to kill a man." Terán shoots Che in the arms and legs and then in Che's thorax, filling his lungs with blood. (Anderson, 796) OCTOBER 9, 1967: Early in the morning, the unit receives the order to execute Guevara and the other prisoners. Lt. Pérez asks Guevara if he wishes anything before his execution. Guevara replies that he only wishes to "die with a full stomach." Pérez asks him if he is a "materialist" and Guevara answers only "perhaps." When Sgt. Terán (the executioner) enters the room, Guevara stands up with his hands tied and states, "I know what you have come for I am ready." Terán tells him to be seated and leaves the room for a few moments. While Terán was outside, Sgt. Huacka enters another small house, where "Willy" was being held, and shoots him. When Terán comes back, Guevara stands up and refuses to be seated saying: "I will remain standing for this." Terán gets angry and tells Guevara to be seated again. Finally, Guevara tells him: "Know this now, you are killing a man." Terán fires his M2 Carbine and kills him. (Dept. of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67). Later that afternoon: Senior army officers and CIA Agent, Félix Rodríguez, leave La Higuera by helicopter for army headquarters in Vallegrande. Upon landing, Rodríguez quickly leaves the helicopter knowing that Castro’s people will be there looking for CIA agents. Pulling a Bolivian army cap over his face, he is not noticed by anyone. (Rodríguez:1, 12; Harris, 130) Che’s body is flown to Vallegrande by helicopter and later fingerprinted and embalmed. (NYT 10/11/67) General Ovando, Chief of Bolivian Armed Forces, states that just before he died, Che said, "I am Che Guevara and I have failed." (James, 8) OCTOBER 10, 1967: W.G. Bowdler sends a note to Walt Rostow saying that they do not know if Che Guevara was "among the casualties of the October 8 engagement." They think that there are no guerrilla survivors. By October 9, they thought two guerrilla were wounded and possibly one of them is Che. (Bowdler, The White House 10/10/67) OCTOBER 10, 1967: Two doctors,. Moisés Abraham Baptista and José Martínez Cazo, at the Hospital Knights of Malta, Vallegrande, Bolivia, sign a death certificate for Che Guevara. The document states that "on October 9 at 5:30 p.m., there arrived...Ernesto Guevara Lynch, approximately 40 years of age, the cause of death being multiple bullet wounds in the thorax and extremities. Preservative was applied to the body." On the same day, and autopsy report records the multiple bullets wounds found in Guevara’s body. "The cause of death," states the autopsy report, "was the thorax wounds and consequent hemorrhaging." (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67) OCTOBER 10, 1967: General Ovando announces that Che died the day before at 1:30 p.m. This means that Che lived for twenty-two hours after the battle in Quebrada del Yuro, which contradicts Colonel Zenteno’s story. Colonel Zenteno changes his story to support General Ovando’s. (James, 15) The New York Times reports that the Bolivian Army High Command dispatches officially confirm that Che was killed in the battle on Sunday October 8th. General Ovando states that Che admitted his identity and the failure of his guerrilla campaign before dying of his wounds. (NYT 10/10/67) Ernesto Guevara, the father of Che, denies the death of his son, stating that there is no evidence to prove the killing. (NYT 10/11/67) OCTOBER 11, 1967: General Ovando claims that on this day Che’s body is buried in the Vallegrande area. (James, 19) OCTOBER 11, 1967: President Lyndon Johnson receives a memorandum from Walt W. Rostow: "This morning we are about 99% sure that "Che" Guevara is dead." The memo informs the President that according to the CIA, Che was taken alive and after a short interrogation General Ovando ordered his execution. (Rostow, "Death of Che Guevara," 10/11/67) OCTOBER 11, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a memorandum to the President stating that they "are 99% sure that ‘Che’ Guevara is dead." He explains that Guevara’s death carries significant implications: "It marks the passing of another of the aggressive, romantic revolutionaries...In the Latin American context, it will have a strong impact in discouraging would -be guerrillas. It shows the soundness of our ‘preventive medicine’ assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency--it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him and got him." (Rostow 10/11/67) OCTOBER 12, 1967: Che’s brother, Roberto, arrives in Bolivia to take the body back to Argentina. However, General Ovando tells him that the body has been cremated. (Anderson, 799) OCTOBER 13, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a note to the President with intelligence information that "removes any doubt that ‘Che" Guevara is dead." (Rostow 10/13/67) OCTOBER 14, 1967: Annex No.3 - three officials of the Argentine Federal police, at the request of the Bolivian Government, visited Bolivian military headquarters in La Paz to help identify the handwriting and fingerprints of Che Guevara. "They were shown a metal container in which were two amputated hands in a liquid solution, apparently formaldehyde." The experts compared the fingerprints with the ones in Guevara’s Argentine identity record, No. 3.524.272, and they were the same. (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67) OCTOBER 14, 1967: Students at Central University of Venezuela protest the U.S. involvement in Che’s death. Demonstrations are organized against a U.S. business, the home of a U.S. citizen, the U.S. Embassy and other similar targets. OCTOBER 15, 1967: Bolivian President Barrientos claims that Che’s ashes are buried in a hidden place somewhere in the Vallegrande region. (Harris, 130) OCTOBER 16, 1967: . The Bolivian Armed Forces released a communiqué together with three annexes on the death of Che Guevara. The communiqué is "based on documents released by the Military High Command on October9...concerning the combat that took place at La Higuera between units of the Armed Forces and the red group commanded by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, as a result of which he, among others, lost his life..." The report states that Guevara died "more or less at 8 p.m. on Sunday, October 8...as a result of his wounds." Also, in order to identify his body it requested the cooperation of Argentine technical organizations to identify the remains to certify that the handwriting of the campaign diary coincides with Guevara’s. Henderson, the U.S. Embassy agent in La Paz, comments that "it will be widely noted that neither the death certificate nor the autopsy report state a time of death." This "would appear to be an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours." He also notes that some early reports indicate that Guevara was captured with minor injuries, while later statements , including the autopsy report, affirm that he suffered multiple wounds. He agrees with a comment by Preséncia, that these statements are "going to be the new focus of polemics in the coming days." (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67) OCTOBER 18, 1967: The U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia sends an airgram to the Department of State with the Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara. (U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia, 10/18/97) OCTOBER 18, 1967: A CIA cable highlights the errors leading to Guevara’s defeat. "There were negative factors and tremendous errors involved in the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serna and the defeat of the guerrillas in Bolivia... ." Che’s presence at the guerrilla front in Bolivia, " ... precluded all hope of saving him and the other leaders in the event of an ambush and virtually condemned them to die or exist uselessly as fugitives." The fact that the guerrillas were so dependent on the local peasant population also proved to be a mistake according to the CIA. Another error described in this cable is Che’s over-confidence in the Bolivian Communist Party, which was relatively new, inexperienced, lacking strong leadership and was internally divided into Trotskyite and Pro-Chinese factions. Finally, the cable states that the victory of the Bolivian army should not be credited to their actions, but to the errors of Castroism. " The guerrilla failure in Bolivia is definitely a leadership failure..."("Comments on the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serna," 10/18/67) OCTOBER 18, 1967: Fidel Castro delivers a eulogy for Che Guevara to nearly a million people --one of his largest audiences ever--in Havana’s Plaza de la Revolución. Castro proclaims that Che’s life-long struggle against imperialism and his ideals will be the inspiration for future generations of revolutionaries. His life was a "glorious page of history" because of his extraordinary military accomplishments, and his unequaled combination of virtues which made him an "artist in guerrilla warfare." Castro professes that Che’s murderers’ will be disappointed when they realize that "the art to which he dedicated his life and intelligence cannot die." (Anderson, 798; Castro’s Eulogy, 10/18/67) OCTOBER 19, 1967: Intelligence and Research’s Cuba specialist, Thomas L. Hughes, writes a memorandum to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. Hughes outlines two significant outcomes of Che Guevara’s death that will affect Fidel Castro’s future political strategies. One is that "Guevara will be eulogized as the model revolutionary who met a heroic death," particularly among future generations of Latin American youth. Castro can utilize this to continue justifying his defiance of the usual suspects--"US imperialism, the Green Berets, the CIA." Another outcome is that Castro will reassess his expectations of exporting revolutions to other Latin American countries. Some Latin American leftists "will be able to argue that any insurgency must be indigenous and that only local parties know when local conditions are right for revolution." (Intelligence and Research Memorandum, "Guevara’s Death--The Meaning for Latin America", 10/19/97) NOVEMBER 8, 1967: The CIA reports that Cuba is threatening assassin a prominent Bolivian figure, such as President Barrientos or General Ovando, in revenge of Che Guevara’s death. ( CIA cable, 11/8/67) JULY 1, 1995: In an interview with biographer Jon Lee Anderson, Bolivian General Mario Vargas Salinas reveals that "he had been a part of a nocturnal burial detail, that Che’s body and those of several of his comrades were buried in a mass grave near the dirt airstrip outside the little mountain town of Vallegrande in Central Bolivia." A subsequent Anderson article in the New York Times sets off a two-year search to find and identify Guevara’s remains. (Anderson,1) JULY 5, 1997: Che Guevara biographer, Jon Lee Anderson, reports for the New York Times that although the remains have not been exhumed and definitely identified, two experts are "100 percent sure" that they have discovered Che’s remains in Vallegrande. The fact that one of the skeletons is missing both of its hands is cited as the most compelling evidence. (NYT 7/5/97) JULY 13, 1997: A ceremony in Havana, attended by Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials, marks the return of Che’s remains to Cuba. (NYT 7/14/97) OCTOBER 17, 1997: In a ceremony attended by Castro and thousands of Cubans, Che Guevara is reburied in Santa Clara, Cuba. (NYT, 10/18/97) LIST OF SOURCES Anderson=Anderson, Jon Lee, Che Guevara : A Revolutionary Life, Grove Press, 1997. Harris= Harris, Richard, Death of a Revolutionary: Che Guevara's Last Mission, W.W. Norton and Company Inc.,1970. James= James, Daniel, Che Guevara: A Biography, Stein and Day, 1970 National Security Files, "Bolivia, Vol. 4" Box 8. NYT=New York Times Rodríguez:1=Rodríguez, Félix I.,Shadow Warrior, Simon and Schuster Inc., 1989 Rodríguez:2=Rodríguez, Félix . BBC documentary, "Executive Action," 1992. Rojo= Rojo, Ricardo, My Friend Che, The Dial Press, Inc., 1968 WT= Washington Times NEW BOOKS ON CHE GUEVARA Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Fall of Che Guevara (New York: Oxford University Press, November 1997; $27.50) Jorge Castañeda, Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Knopf; October 1997, $30.00)

DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

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CIA, The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban Revolution, October 18, 1965: This intelligence memorandum, written by a young CIA analyst, Brian Latell, presents an assessment that Guevara's preeminence as a leader of the Cuban revolution has waned, and his internal and international policies have been abandoned. In domestic policy, his economic strategy of rapid industrialization has "brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power," the paper argues. In foreign policy, he "never wavered from his firm revolutionary stand, even as other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the revolution." With Guevara no longer in Cuba, the CIA's assessment concludes, "there is no doubt that Castro's more cautious position on exporting revolution, as well as his different economic approach, led to Che's downfall."

U.S. Army, Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Activation, Organization and Training of the 2d Battalion - Bolivian Army, April 28, 1967: This memorandum of understanding, written by the head of the U.S. MILGP (Military Group) in Bolivia and signed by the commander of the Bolivian armed forces, created the Second Ranger Battalion to pursue Che Guevara's guerrilla band. The agreement specifies the mission of a sixteen-member Green Beret team of U.S. special forces, drawn from the 8th Special Forces division of the U.S. Army Forces at Southcom in Panama, to "produce a rapid reaction force capable of counterinsurgency operations and skilled to the degree that four months of intensive training can be absorbed by the personnel presented by the Bolivian Armed Forces." In October, the 2nd Battalion, aided by U.S. military and CIA personnel, did engage and capture Che Guevara's small band of rebels.

White House Memorandum, May 11, 1967: This short memo to President Lyndon Johnson records U.S. efforts to track Guevara's movements, and keep the President informed of his whereabouts. Written by presidential advisor, Walt Rostow, the memo reports that Guevara may be "operational" and not dead as the CIA apparently believed after his disappearance from Cuba.

CIA, Intelligence Information Cable, October 17, 1967: This CIA cable summarizes intelligence, gathered from September 1966 through June 1967, on the disagreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba over Che Guevara's mission to Bolivia. The cable provides specific information on Leonid Brezhnev's objections to "the dispatch of Ernesto Che Guevara to Bolivia" and Brezhnev's decision to send the Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin's visit to Cuba in June, 1967 to discuss the Kremlin's opposition with Castro. CIA sources reported that Kosygin accused Castro of "harming the communist cause through his sponsorship of guerrilla activity...and through providing support to various anti-government groups, which although they claimed to be 'socialist' or communist, were engaged in disputes with the 'legitimate' Latin American communist parties...favored by the USSR." In replying Castro stated that Cuba would support the "right of every Latin American to contribute to the liberation of his country." Castro also "accused the USSR of having turned its back upon its own revolutionary tradition and of having moved to a point where it would refuse to support any revolutionary movement unless the actions of the latter contributed to the achievement of Soviet objectives...."

White House Memorandum, October 9, 1967: Walt Rostow reports in this memorandum to President Johnson that unconfirmed information suggests that the Bolivian battalion--"the one we have been training"--"got Che Guevara."

White House Memorandum, October 10, 1967: In a short update to Walt Rostow, William Bowdler reports there is still uncertainty about whether Che Guevara was "among the casualties of the October 8 engagement."

White House Memorandum, October 11, 1967: In another daily update, Walt Rostow reports to President Johnson that "we are 99% sure that 'Che' Guevara is dead." Rostow believes the decision to execute Guevara "is stupid," but he also points out his death "shows the soundness of our 'preventive medicine' assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency--it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him and got him."

White House Memorandum, October 13, 1967: In a final update, Walt Rostow informs Lyndon Johnson that the White House has intelligence information--still censored--that "removes any doubt that 'Che' Guevara is dead."

CIA Debriefing of Félix Rodríguez, June 3, 1975 When Che Guevara was executed in La Higuera, one CIA official was present--a Cuban-American operative named Félix Rodríguez. Rodríguez, who used the codename "Félix Ramos" in Bolivia and posed as a Bolivian military officer, was secretly debriefed on his role by the CIA's office of the Inspector General in June, 1975. (At the time the CIA was the focus of a major Congressional investigation into its assassination operations against foreign leaders.) In this debriefing--discovered in a declassified file marked 'Félix Rodríguez' by journalist David Corn--Rodríguez recounts the details of his mission to Bolivia where the CIA sent him, and another Cuban-American agent, Gustavo Villoldo, to assist the capture of Guevara and destruction of his guerrilla band. Rodríguez and Villoldo became part of a CIA task force in Bolivia that included the case officer for the operation, "Jim", another Cuban American, Mario Osiris Riveron, and two agents in charge of communications in Santa Clara. Rodríguez emerged as the most important member of the group; after a lengthy interrogation of one captured guerrilla, he was instrumental in focusing the efforts to the 2nd Ranger Battalion focus on the Villagrande region where he believed Guevara's rebels were operating. Although he apparently was under CIA instructions to "do everything possible to keep him alive," Rodríguez transmitted the order to execute Guevara from the Bolivian High Command to the soldiers at La Higueras--he also directed them not to shoot Guevara in the face so that his wounds would appear to be combat-related--and personally informed Che that he would be killed. After the execution, Rodríguez took Che's Rolex watch, often proudly showing it to reporters during the ensuing years.

State Department Cable, Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara, October 18, 1967: Ten days after his capture, U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia, Douglas Henderson, transmitted confirmation of Guevara's death to Washington. The evidence included autopsy reports, and fingerprint analysis conducted by Argentine police officials on Che's amputated hands. (Che's hands were cut off to provide proof that he was actually dead; under the supervision of CIA agent Gustavo Villoldo, his body was then secretly buried by at a desolate airstrip at Villagrande where it was only discovered in June 1997.) The various death documents, notes Ambassador Henderson, leave "unsaid the time of death"--"an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours."

Southern Command, Activities of the 2nd Ranger Battalion and Death of Che Guevara: The U.S. Special Forces Group, which trained the Bolivan military units that captured Che Guevara, conducted an extensive debriefing of members of the 2nd Ranger Battalion. This report, based on interviews by a member of the U.S. Mobile Training Team in Bolivia with key Bolivian commanders, documents the military movements, and engagement with Che Guevara's guerrilla band. The sources also provide key details and descriptions of his capture, interrogation and execution, although it makes no mention of the CIA official, Félix Rodríguez, who was present. Guevara's last words to the soldier who shot him are reported as: "Know this now, you are killing a man."

Department of State, Guevara's Death--The Meaning for Latin America, October 12, 1967: In this interpretive report for Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Thomas Hughes, the Latin America specialist at the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, summarizes the importance of "the defeat of the foremost tactician of the Cuban revolutionary strategy." The analyst predicts that Guevara "will be eulogized as the model revolutionary who met a heroic death." The circumstances of his failure in Bolivia, however, will strengthen the position of "peaceful line" communist party groups in the Hemisphere. Castro, he argues, will be subject to "we told you so" criticism from older leftist parties, but his "spell on the more youthful elements in the hemisphere will not be broken." The analysis fails to incorporate evidence of the disagreement between Castro and Guevara on the prospects for revolution in Latin America, or the Soviet pressure on Cuba to reduce support for insurgent movements in the Hemisphere.

CIA, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Fidel Castro Delivers Eulogy on Che Guevara, October 19, 1967: On October 18, 1967, the third day of national mourning, Fidel Castro delivered a eulogy to a crowd of almost one million at the Plaza de La Revolución in Havana. The next day, the speech is transcribed and distributed by FBIS, a CIA transcription agency that records, and translates news and television from around the world. Calling Guevara "an artist of revolutionary warfare," Castro warns that "they who sing victory" over his death--a reference to the U.S.--" are mistaken. They are mistaken who believe that his death is the defeat of his ideas, the defeat of his tactics, the defeat of his guerrilla concepts." This speech contributes immeasurably to the making of the revolutionary icon that Che Guevara became in the ensuing years. "If we want to know how we want our children to be," Castro concludes, "we should say, with all our revolutionary mind and heart: We want them to be like Che."

THE DEATH OF CHE GUEVARA:

A CHRONOLOGY

Compiled by:

Paola Evans, Kim Healey, Peter Kornbluh, Ramón Cruz and Hannah Elinson

OCTOBER 3, 1965: In a public speech, Fidel Castro reads a "Farewell" letter written by Che in April, in which Che resigns from all of his official positions within the Cuban government. The letter, which Che apparently never intended to be made public, states that "I have fulfilled the part of my duty that tied me to the Cuban revolution...and I say goodbye to you, to the comrades, to your people, who are now mine." (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "Castro and Communism: The Cuban Revolution in Perspective," 5/9/66)

OCTOBER 18, 1965: A CIA Intelligence Memorandum discusses what analysts perceive as Che Guevara’s fall from power within the Cuban government beginning in 1964. It states that at the end of 1963, Guevara’s plan of "rapid industrialization and centralization during the first years of the Revolution brought the economy to its lowest point since Castro came to power." "Guevara’s outlook, which approximated present -day Chinese--rather than Soviet--economic practice, was behind the controversy." In July 1964, "two important cabinet appointments signaled the power struggle over internal economic policy which culminated in Guevara’s elimination." Another conflict was that Guevara wanted to export the Cuban Revolution to different parts of Latin America and Africa, while "other Cuban leaders began to devote most of their attention to the internal problems of the Revolution." In December, 1964, Guevara departed on a three-month trip to the United States, Africa, and China. When he returned, according to the CIA report, his economic and foreign policies were in disfavor and he left to start revolutionary struggles in other parts of the world. (CIA Intelligence Memorandum, "The Fall of Che Guevara and the Changing Face of the Cuban Revolution," 10/18/65)

FALL, 1966: Che Guevara arrives in Bolivia sometime between the second week of September and the first of November of 1966, according to different sources. He enters the country with forged Uruguayan passports to organize and lead a communist guerrilla movement. Che chooses Bolivia as the revolutionary base for various reasons. First, Bolivia is of lower priority than Caribbean Basin countries to US security interests and poses a less immediate threat, "... the Yanquis wouldn’t concern themselves... ." Second, Bolivia’s social conditions and poverty are such that Bolivia is considered susceptible to revolutionary ideology. Finally, Bolivia shares a border with five other countries, which would allow the revolution to spread easily if the guerrillas are successful. (Harris, 60, 73; Rojo 193-194; Rodríguez:1, 157;Rodríguez:1, 198)

SPRING, 1967: From March to August of 1967, Che Guevara and his guerrilla band strike "pretty much at will" against the Bolivian Armed Forces, which totals about twenty thousand men. The guerrillas lose only one man compared to 30 of the Bolivians during these six months. (James, 250, NYT 9/16/67)

APRIL 28, 1967: General Ovando, of the Bolivian Armed Forces, and the U.S. Army Section signed a Memorandum of Understanding with regard to the 2nd Ranger Battalion of the Bolivian Army "which clearly defines the terms of U.S.-Bolivian Armed Forces cooperation in the activation, organization, and training of this unit."

MAY 11, 1967: Walt Rostow, presidential advisor to Lyndon B. Johnson, sends a message to the President saying that he received the first credible report that "Che" Guevara is alive and operating in South America, although more evidence is needed. (Rostow 05/11/67)

JUNE, 1967: Cuban-American CIA agent Félix Rodríguez receives a phone call from a CIA officer, Larry S., who proposes a special assignment for him in South America in which he will use his skills in unconventional warfare, counter-guerrilla operations and communications. The assignment is to assist the Bolivians in tracking down and capturing Che Guevara and his band. His partner will be "Eduardo González" and Rodríguez is to use the cover name "Félix Ramos Medina." (Rodríguez:1, 148)

JUNE 26-30, 1967: Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin visits Cuba for discussions with Fidel Castro. According to a CIA intelligence cable, the primary purpose of his "trip to Havana June 26-30, 1967 was to inform Castro concerning the Middle East Crisis...A secondary but important reason for the trip was to discuss with Castro the subject of Cuban revolutionary activity in Latin America." The Soviet Premier criticizes the dispatch of Che Guevara to Bolivia and accuses Castro of "harming the communist cause through his sponsorship of guerrilla activity...and through providing support to various anti-government groups, which although they claimed to be "socialist" or communist, were engaged in disputes with the "legitimate" Latin American communist parties, those favored by the USSR." In reply Castro stated that Cuba will support the "right of every Latin American to contribute to the liberation of his country." (CIA Intelligence Information Cable, 10/17/67)

AUGUST 2, 1967: Rodríguez and González arrive in La Paz, Bolivia. They are met by their case officer, Jim, another CIA agent, and a Bolivian immigration officer. The CIA station in La Paz is run by John Tilton; eventually the CIA’s Guevara task force is joined by another anti-Castro Cuban-American agent, Gustavo Villoldo. (Rodríguez:1, 162)

AUGUST 31, 1967: The Bolivian army scores its first victory against the guerrillas, wiping out one-third of Che’s men. José Castillo Chávez, also known as Paco, is captured and the guerrillas are forced to retreat. Che’s health begins to deteriorate. (James, 250, 269)

SEPTEMBER 3, 1967: Félix Rodríguez flies with Major Arnaldo Saucedo from Santa Cruz to Vallegrande to interrogate Paco. (Rodríguez: 1, 167)

SEPTEMBER 15, 1967: The Bolivian Government air-drops leaflets offering a $4,200 reward for the capture of Che Guevara. (NYT 9/16/67)

SEPTEMBER 18, 1967: Fifteen members of a Communist group, who were providing supplies to the guerrillas in the southeastern jungles of Bolivia, are arrested. (NYT 9/19/67)

SEPTEMBER 22, 1967: Che’s guerrillas arrive at Alto Seco village in Bolivia. Inti Peredo, a Bolivian guerrilla, gives the villagers a lecture on the objectives of the guerrilla movement. The group leaves later that night after purchasing a large amount of food. (Harris, 123)

According to Jon Lee Anderson’s account, Che takes the food from a grocery store without paying for it after discovering that the local authorities in Alto Seco have left to inform the army about the guerrilla’s position. (Anderson, 785)

SEPTEMBER 22, 1967: Guevara Arze, the Bolivian Foreign Minister, provides evidence to the Organization of American States to prove that Che Guevara is indeed leading the guerrilla operations in Bolivia. Excerpts taken from captured documents, including comparisons of handwriting, fingerprints and photographs, suggests that the guerrillas are comprised of Cubans, Peruvians, Argentineans and Bolivians. The foreign minister’s presentation draws a loud applause from the Bolivian audience, and he gives his assurance that "we’re not going to let anybody steal our country away from us. Nobody, at any time." (NYT 9/23/67)

SEPTEMBER 24, 1967: Che and his men arrive, exhausted and sick, at Loma Larga, a ranch close to Alto Seco. All but one of the peasants flee upon their arrival. (Harris, 123)

SEPTEMBER 26, 1967: The guerrillas move to the village of La Higuera and immediately notice that all the men are gone. The villagers have previously been warned that the guerrillas are in the area and they should send any information on them to Vallegrande. The remaining villagers tell the guerrillas that most of the people are at a celebration in a neighboring town called Jahue. (Harris, 123)

1 p.m.: As they are about to depart for Jahue, the rebels hear shots coming from the road and are forced to stay in the village and defend themselves. Three guerrillas are killed in the gun battle: Roberto (Coco) Peredo, a Bolivian guerrilla leader who was one of Che’s most important men; "Antonio," believed to be Cuban; and "Julio," likely a Bolivian. Che orders his men to evacuate the village along a road leading to Rio Grande. The army high command and the Barriento government consider this encounter a significant victory. Indeed, Che notes in his diary that La Higuera has caused great losses for him in respect to his rebel cell. (Harris 123,124; NYT 9/28/67))

CIA agent, Félix Rodríguez, under the alias, "Captain Ramos," urges Colonel Zenteno to move his Rangers battalion from La Esperanza headquarters to Vallegrande. The death of Antonio, the vanguard commander [also called Miguel by Rodríguez], prompts Rodríguez to conclude that Che must be close by. Colonel Zenteno argues that the battalion has not yet finished their training, but he will move them as soon as this training is complete. Convinced that he knows Che’s next move, Rodríguez continues pressuring Zenteno to order the 2nd Ranger battalion into combat. (Rodríguez:1, 184)

SEPTEMBER 26-27, 1967: After the battle of La Higueras, the Ranger Battalion sets up a screening force along the river San Antonio to prevent exfiltration of the guerrilla force. During the mission, the troops captures a guerrilla known as "Gamba." He appears to be in poor health and is poorly clothed. This produces an immediate morale effect on the troops because they notice that the guerrillas are not as strong as they thought. "Gamba" says that he had separated from the group and was traveling in hope of contacting "Ramón" (Guevara). (Dept. of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67).

SEPTEMBER 29, 1967: Colonel Zenteno is finally persuaded by Rodríguez, and he moves the 2nd Ranger battalion to Vallegrande. Rodríguez joins these six hundred and fifty men who have been trained by U.S. Special Forces Major "Pappy" Shelton. (Rodríguez:1, 184)

SEPTEMBER 30, 1967: Che and his group are trapped by the army in a jungle canyon in Valle Serrano, south of the Grande River. (NYT 10/1/67)

OCTOBER 7, 1967: The last entry in Che’s diary is recorded exactly eleven months since the inauguration of the guerrilla movement. The guerrillas run into an old woman herding goats. They ask her if there are soldiers in the area but are unable to get any reliable information. Scared that she will report them, they pay her 50 pesos to keep quiet. In Che’s diary it is noted that he has "little hope" that she will do so. (Harris, 126; CIA Weekly Review, "The Che Guevara Diary," 12/15/67)

Evening: Che and his men stop to rest in a ravine in Quebrada del Yuro. (Harris, 126)

OCTOBER 8, 1967: The troops receive information that there is a band of 17 guerrillas in the Churro Ravine. They enter the area and encounters a group of 6 to 8 guerrillas, opens fire, and killed two Cubans, "Antonio" and "Orturo." "Ramon" (Guevara) and "Willy" try to break out in the direction of the mortar section, where Guevara is wounded in the lower calf. (Dept. of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67)

OCTOBER 8, 1967: A peasant women alerts the army that she heard voices along the banks of the Yuro close to the spot where it runs along the San Antonio river. It is unknown whether it is the same peasant woman that the guerrillas ran into previously. (Rojo 218)

By morning, several companies of Bolivian Rangers are deployed through the area that Guevara’s Guerrillas are in. They take up positions in the same ravine as the guerrillas in Quebrada del Yuro. (Harris,126)

About 12 p.m.: A unit from General Prado’s company, all recent graduates of the U.S. Army Special Forces training camp, confronts the guerrillas, killing two soldiers and wounding many others. (Harris, 127)

1:30 p.m.: Che’s final battle commences in Quebrada del Yuro. Simon Cuba (Willy) Sarabia, a Bolivian miner, leads the rebel group. Che is behind him and is shot in the leg several times. Sarabia picks up Che and tries to carry him away from the line of fire. The firing starts again and Che’s beret is knocked off. Sarabia sits Che on the ground so he can return the fire. Encircled at less than ten yards distance, the Rangers concentrate their fire on him, riddling him with bullets. Che attempts to keep firing, but cannot keep his gun up with only one arm. He is hit again on his right leg, his gun is knocked out of his hand and his right forearm is pierced. As soldiers approach Che he shouts, "Do not shoot! I am Che Guevara and worth more to you alive than dead." The battle ends at approximately 3:30 p.m. Che is taken prisoner. (Rojo, 219; James, 14)

Other sources claim that Sarabia is captured alive and at about 4 p.m. he and Che are brought before Captain Prado. Captain Prado orders his radio operator to signal the divisional headquarters in Vallegrande informing them that Che is captured. The coded message sent is "Hello Saturno, we have Papá !" Saturno is the code for Colonel Joaquin Zenteno, commandant of the Eighth Bolivian Army Division, and Papá is code for Che. In disbelief, Colonel Zenteno asks Capt. Prado to confirm the message. With confirmation, "general euphoria" erupts among the divisional headquarters staff. Colonel Zenteno radios Capt. Prado and tells him to immediately transfer Che and any other prisoners to La Higuera. (Harris, 127)

In Vallegrande, Félix Rodríguez receives the message over the radio: "Papá cansado," which means "Dad is tired." Papá is the code for foreigner, implying Che. Tired signifies captured or wounded. (Rodríguez:1, 185)

Stretched out on a blanket, Che is carried by four soldiers to La Higuera, seven kilometers away. Sarabia is forced to walk behind with his hands tied against his back. Just after dark the group arrives in La Higuera and both Che and Sarabia are put into the one-room schoolhouse. Later that night, five more guerrillas are brought in. (Harris, 127)

Official army dispatches falsely report that Che is killed in the clash in southeastern Bolivia, and other official reports confirm the killing of Che and state that the Bolivian army has his body. However, the army high command does not confirm this report. (NYT 10/10/67)

OCTOBER 9, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a memorandum to the President with tentative information that the Bolivians have captured Che Guevara. The Bolivian unit engaged in the operation was the one that had been trained by the U.S. (Rostow 10/9/67)

OCTOBER 9, 1967: 6:15 a.m.: Félix Rodríguez arrives by helicopter in La Higuera, along with Colonel Joaquín Zenteno Anaya. Rodríguez brings a powerful portable field radio and a camera with a special four-footed stand used to photograph documents. He quietly observes the scene in the schoolhouse, and records what he sees, finding the situation "gruesome" with Che lying in dirt, his arms tied behind his back and his feet bound together, next to the bodies of his friends. He looks "like a piece of trash" with matted hair, torn clothes, and wearing only pieces of leather on his feet for shoes. In one interview, Rodríguez states that, " I had mixed emotions when I first arrived there. Here was the man who had assassinated many of my countrymen. And nevertheless, when I saw him, the way he looked....I felt really sorry for him." (Rodríguez:2)

Rodríguez sets up his radio and transmits a coded message to the CIA station in either Peru or Brazil to be retransmitted to Langley headquarters. Rodríguez also starts to photograph Che’s diary and other captured documents. Later, Rodríguez spends time talking with Che and takes a picture with him. The photos that Rodríguez takes are preserved by the CIA. (Anderson, 793; Rodríguez:1, 193)

10 am: The Bolivian officers are faced with the question of what to do with Che. The possibility of prosecuting him is ruled out because a trial would focus world attention on him and could generate sympathetic propaganda for Che and for Cuba. It is concluded that Che must be executed immediately, but it is agreed upon that the official story will be that he died from wounds received in battle. Félix Rodríguez receives a call from Vallegrande and is ordered by the Superior Command to conduct Operation Five Hundred and Six Hundred. Five hundred is the Bolivian code for Che and six hundred is the order to kill him. Rodríguez informs Colonel Zenteno of the order, but also tells him that the U.S. government has instructed him to keep Che alive at all costs. The CIA and the U.S. government have arranged helicopters and airplanes to take Che to Panama for interrogation. However, Colonel Zenteno says he must obey his own orders and Rodríguez decides, "to let history take its course," and to leave the matter in the hands of the Bolivians. (Anderson, 795; Harris 128, 129; Rodríguez:1, 193; Rodríguez:2)

Rodríguez realizes that he cannot stall any longer when a school teacher informs him that she has heard a news report on Che’s death on her radio. Rodríguez enters the schoolhouse to tell Che of the orders from the Bolivian high command. Che understands and says, "It is better like this ... I never should have been captured alive." Che gives Rodríguez a message for his wife and for Fidel, they embrace and Rodríguez leaves the room. (Rodríguez:2; Anderson, 796)

According to one source, the top ranking officers in La Higuera instruct the noncommissioned officers to carry out the order and straws are drawn to determine who will execute Che. Just before noon, having drawn the shortest straw, Sergeant Jaime Terán goes to the schoolhouse to execute Che. Terán finds Che propped up against the wall and Che asks him to wait a moment until he stands up. Terán is frightened, runs away and is ordered back by Colonel Selich and Colonel Zenteno. "Still trembling" he returns to the schoolhouse and without looking at Che’s face he fires into his chest and side. Several soldiers, also wanting to shoot Che, enter the room and shoot him. (Harris, 129)

Félix Rodríguez has stated that, "I told the Sargento to shoot....and I understand that he borrowed an M-2 carbine from a Lt. Pérez who was in the area." Rodríguez places the time of the shooting at 1:10 p.m. Bolivian time. (Rodríguez:2)

In Jon Lee Anderson’s account, Sergeant Terán volunteers to shoot Che. Che's last words, which are addressed to Terán, are "I know you've come to kill me. Shoot, you are only going to kill a man." Terán shoots Che in the arms and legs and then in Che's thorax, filling his lungs with blood. (Anderson, 796)

OCTOBER 9, 1967: Early in the morning, the unit receives the order to execute Guevara and the other prisoners. Lt. Pérez asks Guevara if he wishes anything before his execution. Guevara replies that he only wishes to "die with a full stomach." Pérez asks him if he is a "materialist" and Guevara answers only "perhaps." When Sgt. Terán (the executioner) enters the room, Guevara stands up with his hands tied and states, "I know what you have come for I am ready." Terán tells him to be seated and leaves the room for a few moments. While Terán was outside, Sgt. Huacka enters another small house, where "Willy" was being held, and shoots him. When Terán comes back, Guevara stands up and refuses to be seated saying: "I will remain standing for this." Terán gets angry and tells Guevara to be seated again. Finally, Guevara tells him: "Know this now, you are killing a man." Terán fires his M2 Carbine and kills him. (Dept. of Defense Intelligence Information Report - 11/28/67).

Later that afternoon: Senior army officers and CIA Agent, Félix Rodríguez, leave La Higuera by helicopter for army headquarters in Vallegrande. Upon landing, Rodríguez quickly leaves the helicopter knowing that Castro’s people will be there looking for CIA agents. Pulling a Bolivian army cap over his face, he is not noticed by anyone. (Rodríguez:1, 12; Harris, 130)

Che’s body is flown to Vallegrande by helicopter and later fingerprinted and embalmed. (NYT 10/11/67)

General Ovando, Chief of Bolivian Armed Forces, states that just before he died, Che said, "I am Che Guevara and I have failed." (James, 8)

OCTOBER 10, 1967: W.G. Bowdler sends a note to Walt Rostow saying that they do not know if Che Guevara was "among the casualties of the October 8 engagement." They think that there are no guerrilla survivors. By October 9, they thought two guerrilla were wounded and possibly one of them is Che. (Bowdler, The White House 10/10/67)

OCTOBER 10, 1967: Two doctors,. Moisés Abraham Baptista and José Martínez Cazo, at the Hospital Knights of Malta, Vallegrande, Bolivia, sign a death certificate for Che Guevara. The document states that "on October 9 at 5:30 p.m., there arrived...Ernesto Guevara Lynch, approximately 40 years of age, the cause of death being multiple bullet wounds in the thorax and extremities. Preservative was applied to the body." On the same day, and autopsy report records the multiple bullets wounds found in Guevara’s body. "The cause of death," states the autopsy report, "was the thorax wounds and consequent hemorrhaging." (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67)

OCTOBER 10, 1967: General Ovando announces that Che died the day before at 1:30 p.m. This means that Che lived for twenty-two hours after the battle in Quebrada del Yuro, which contradicts Colonel Zenteno’s story. Colonel Zenteno changes his story to support General Ovando’s. (James, 15)

The New York Times reports that the Bolivian Army High Command dispatches officially confirm that Che was killed in the battle on Sunday October 8th. General Ovando states that Che admitted his identity and the failure of his guerrilla campaign before dying of his wounds. (NYT 10/10/67)

Ernesto Guevara, the father of Che, denies the death of his son, stating that there is no evidence to prove the killing. (NYT 10/11/67)

OCTOBER 11, 1967: General Ovando claims that on this day Che’s body is buried in the Vallegrande area. (James, 19)

OCTOBER 11, 1967: President Lyndon Johnson receives a memorandum from Walt W. Rostow: "This morning we are about 99% sure that "Che" Guevara is dead." The memo informs the President that according to the CIA, Che was taken alive and after a short interrogation General Ovando ordered his execution. (Rostow, "Death of Che Guevara," 10/11/67)

OCTOBER 11, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a memorandum to the President stating that they "are 99% sure that ‘Che’ Guevara is dead." He explains that Guevara’s death carries significant implications: "It marks the passing of another of the aggressive, romantic revolutionaries...In the Latin American context, it will have a strong impact in discouraging would -be guerrillas. It shows the soundness of our ‘preventive medicine’ assistance to countries facing incipient insurgency--it was the Bolivian 2nd Ranger Battalion, trained by our Green Berets from June-September of this year, that cornered him and got him." (Rostow 10/11/67)

OCTOBER 12, 1967: Che’s brother, Roberto, arrives in Bolivia to take the body back to Argentina. However, General Ovando tells him that the body has been cremated. (Anderson, 799)

OCTOBER 13, 1967: Walt Rostow sends a note to the President with intelligence information that "removes any doubt that ‘Che" Guevara is dead." (Rostow 10/13/67)

OCTOBER 14, 1967: Annex No.3 - three officials of the Argentine Federal police, at the request of the Bolivian Government, visited Bolivian military headquarters in La Paz to help identify the handwriting and fingerprints of Che Guevara. "They were shown a metal container in which were two amputated hands in a liquid solution, apparently formaldehyde." The experts compared the fingerprints with the ones in Guevara’s Argentine identity record, No. 3.524.272, and they were the same. (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67)

OCTOBER 14, 1967: Students at Central University of Venezuela protest the U.S. involvement in Che’s death. Demonstrations are organized against a U.S. business, the home of a U.S. citizen, the U.S. Embassy and other similar targets.

OCTOBER 15, 1967: Bolivian President Barrientos claims that Che’s ashes are buried in a hidden place somewhere in the Vallegrande region. (Harris, 130)

OCTOBER 16, 1967: . The Bolivian Armed Forces released a communiqué together with three annexes on the death of Che Guevara. The communiqué is "based on documents released by the Military High Command on October9...concerning the combat that took place at La Higuera between units of the Armed Forces and the red group commanded by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, as a result of which he, among others, lost his life..." The report states that Guevara died "more or less at 8 p.m. on Sunday, October 8...as a result of his wounds." Also, in order to identify his body it requested the cooperation of Argentine technical organizations to identify the remains to certify that the handwriting of the campaign diary coincides with Guevara’s. Henderson, the U.S. Embassy agent in La Paz, comments that "it will be widely noted that neither the death certificate nor the autopsy report state a time of death." This "would appear to be an attempt to bridge the difference between a series of earlier divergent statements from Armed Forces sources, ranging from assertions that he died during or shortly after battle to those suggesting he survived at least twenty-four hours." He also notes that some early reports indicate that Guevara was captured with minor injuries, while later statements , including the autopsy report, affirm that he suffered multiple wounds. He agrees with a comment by Preséncia, that these statements are "going to be the new focus of polemics in the coming days." (U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia, Airgram, 10/18/67)

OCTOBER 18, 1967: The U.S. Embassy in La Paz, Bolivia sends an airgram to the Department of State with the Official Confirmation of Death of Che Guevara. (U.S. Embassy, La Paz, Bolivia, 10/18/97)

OCTOBER 18, 1967: A CIA cable highlights the errors leading to Guevara’s defeat. "There were negative factors and tremendous errors involved in the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serna and the defeat of the guerrillas in Bolivia... ." Che’s presence at the guerrilla front in Bolivia, " ... precluded all hope of saving him and the other leaders in the event of an ambush and virtually condemned them to die or exist uselessly as fugitives." The fact that the guerrillas were so dependent on the local peasant population also proved to be a mistake according to the CIA. Another error described in this cable is Che’s over-confidence in the Bolivian Communist Party, which was relatively new, inexperienced, lacking strong leadership and was internally divided into Trotskyite and Pro-Chinese factions. Finally, the cable states that the victory of the Bolivian army should not be credited to their actions, but to the errors of Castroism. " The guerrilla failure in Bolivia is definitely a leadership failure..."("Comments on the death of Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serna," 10/18/67)

OCTOBER 18, 1967: Fidel Castro delivers a eulogy for Che Guevara to nearly a million people --one of his largest audiences ever--in Havana’s Plaza de la Revolución. Castro proclaims that Che’s life-long struggle against imperialism and his ideals will be the inspiration for future generations of revolutionaries. His life was a "glorious page of history" because of his extraordinary military accomplishments, and his unequaled combination of virtues which made him an "artist in guerrilla warfare." Castro professes that Che’s murderers’ will be disappointed when they realize that "the art to which he dedicated his life and intelligence cannot die." (Anderson, 798; Castro’s Eulogy, 10/18/67)

OCTOBER 19, 1967: Intelligence and Research’s Cuba specialist, Thomas L. Hughes, writes a memorandum to Secretary of State, Dean Rusk. Hughes outlines two significant outcomes of Che Guevara’s death that will affect Fidel Castro’s future political strategies. One is that "Guevara will be eulogized as the model revolutionary who met a heroic death," particularly among future generations of Latin American youth. Castro can utilize this to continue justifying his defiance of the usual suspects--"US imperialism, the Green Berets, the CIA." Another outcome is that Castro will reassess his expectations of exporting revolutions to other Latin American countries. Some Latin American leftists "will be able to argue that any insurgency must be indigenous and that only local parties know when local conditions are right for revolution." (Intelligence and Research Memorandum, "Guevara’s Death--The Meaning for Latin America", 10/19/97)

NOVEMBER 8, 1967: The CIA reports that Cuba is threatening assassin a prominent Bolivian figure, such as President Barrientos or General Ovando, in revenge of Che Guevara’s death. ( CIA cable, 11/8/67)

JULY 1, 1995: In an interview with biographer Jon Lee Anderson, Bolivian General Mario Vargas Salinas reveals that "he had been a part of a nocturnal burial detail, that Che’s body and those of several of his comrades were buried in a mass grave near the dirt airstrip outside the little mountain town of Vallegrande in Central Bolivia." A subsequent Anderson article in the New York Times sets off a two-year search to find and identify Guevara’s remains. (Anderson,1)

JULY 5, 1997: Che Guevara biographer, Jon Lee Anderson, reports for the New York Times that although the remains have not been exhumed and definitely identified, two experts are "100 percent sure" that they have discovered Che’s remains in Vallegrande. The fact that one of the skeletons is missing both of its hands is cited as the most compelling evidence. (NYT 7/5/97)

JULY 13, 1997: A ceremony in Havana, attended by Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials, marks the return of Che’s remains to Cuba. (NYT 7/14/97)

OCTOBER 17, 1997: In a ceremony attended by Castro and thousands of Cubans, Che Guevara is reburied in Santa Clara, Cuba. (NYT, 10/18/97)

LIST OF SOURCES

Anderson=Anderson, Jon Lee, Che Guevara : A Revolutionary Life, Grove Press, 1997.

Harris= Harris, Richard, Death of a Revolutionary: Che Guevara's Last Mission, W.W. Norton and Company Inc.,1970.

James= James, Daniel, Che Guevara: A Biography, Stein and Day, 1970

National Security Files, "Bolivia, Vol. 4" Box 8.

NYT=New York Times

Rodríguez:1=Rodríguez, Félix I.,Shadow Warrior, Simon and Schuster Inc., 1989

Rodríguez:2=Rodríguez, Félix . BBC documentary, "Executive Action," 1992.

Rojo= Rojo, Ricardo, My Friend Che, The Dial Press, Inc., 1968

WT= Washington Times

NEW BOOKS ON CHE GUEVARA

Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Fall of Che Guevara
(New York: Oxford University Press, November 1997; $27.50)

Jorge Castañeda, Compañero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Knopf; October 1997, $30.00)

terça-feira, janeiro 27, 2009

Massacres de Gaza

•

Albano
Nunes

Membro do Secretariado

Há que dar ainda mais força às acções de solidariedade com a Palestina

Massacre de Gaza
Pontos de referência essenciais

O martírio da população da Faixa de Gaza tem sido enquadrado por uma orquestração mediática que manipula e desinforma, submerge informação verídica e opinião construtiva, esconde as questões de fundo, banaliza e absolve os piores crimes. Importa por isso não perder de vista pontos de referência fundamentais.

A raiz do conflito. É necessário não esquecer, como pretende a propaganda sionista, que ela reside na expulsão violenta de milhões de palestinianos das suas terras e das suas casas e na transformação da vida das populações dos territórios ocupados num autentico inferno. Enquanto os direitos nacionais do povo palestiniano não forem reconhecidos e respeitados, enquanto não for criado e garantido um Estado palestiniano independente e soberano com capital em Jerusalém, enquanto não forem implementadas as resoluções da ONU sobre a questão palestiniana, não haverá uma paz justa e duradoura na região.
As incontáveis «tréguas», «acordos» e «processos de paz» que se têm sucedido, ignorando ou subalternizando sempre esta questão central, só têm servido para consolidar no terreno as posições do ocupante.
Um Estado fora da lei. A coberto de uma fachada interna «democrática» e da manipulação das terríveis perseguições de que os judeus foram vítimas pela Alemanha de Hitler, Israel tornou-se num Estado que viola sistematicamente a legalidade internacional e que, à semelhança do nazismo, recorre a práticas caracterizadas pelo desprezo pela vida humana, a crueldade, a retaliação e perseguição em massa. É necessário chamar as coisas pelos nomes e não fechar os olhos a uma realidade que os massacres de Gaza tão dramaticamente denunciam.
A responsabilidade dos EUA. Fortemente militarizado, com um Exército e serviços secretos sofisticados, dispondo de armas nucleares e químicas nunca declaradas, Israel é entretanto um Estado cujo poder depende dos EUA e a sua criminosa política de terrorismo de Estado é afinal expressão da política terrorista do imperialismo norte-americano. Israel não é mais que uma fortaleza avançada dos EUA para a sua estratégia de domínio do Médio Oriente. A comprová-lo está o acordo entre Israel e os EUA, assinado em plena ofensiva assassina, visando a extensão das operações navais norte-americanas na região, numa escalada agressiva já denunciada pela FDLP e por outras forças progressistas palestinianas.
A cumplicidade da União Europeia. Em ano de eleições para o Parlamento Europeu ganha ainda maior relevância a cumplicidade da UE com os crimes das tropas israelitas. Em plena ofensiva contra Gaza, em lugar da condenação e sanções ao agressor, a UE oferece a Israel o reforço do seu estatuto de associação. E o PE adopta por esmagadora maioria uma resolução que os deputados do PCP não puderam acompanhar por colocar no mesmo plano agressor e agredido, iludir as questões de fundo e pôr a UE uma vez mais a reboque dos EUA.

Realidades de sinal contrário

A ONU. Salta à vista a impotência da ONU e a instrumentalização do seu Conselho de Segurança e do seu Secretário-Geral, Ban Ki-moon, um ridículo homem de palha do imperialismo. Situação perigosa recordando o lamentável desempenho da Sociedade das Nações que precedeu a II Guerra Mundial.
Simultaneamente, verifica-se também uma realidade de sinal contrário, positiva, que a generalidade da comunicação social silenciou: coragem e dignidade do Presidente da Assembleia-Geral da ONU, Miguel D’Escoto, que, coerente com os valores da revolução sandinista de que foi protagonista destacado, não hesitou em denunciar os crimes dos agressores e em afirmar que «Israel não é mais do que um tentáculo dos EUA nessa parte do mundo».
Coragem e dignidade também na Comissão de Direitos Humanos da ONU com uma excelente Resolução exigindo a imediata retirada de Israel da Faixa de Gaza aprovada por 33 votos contra 1 (do Canadá) e 13 abstenções, significativamente de países da UE e outros aliados dos EUA.
Portugal. O seguidismo do Governo do PS em relação aos EUA, à UE e à NATO é uma vergonha. Noticia-se que o Governo não autorizaria a passagem por Portugal de armas para Israel. Mas as Lages lá estão para o que os EUA entenderem necessário às suas «operações encobertas» de subversão e agressão, nomeadamente no Médio Oriente e é cada vez mais frequente, como agora no Afeganistão, a participação das Forças Armadas portuguesas em operações de guerra imperialista.
A luta. Só a luta anti-imperialista, a solidariedade internacionalista, a acção comum ou convergente dos comunistas e de todas as forças do progresso social, pode atar as mãos criminosas dos agressores sionistas e dos seus patrões norte-americanos e europeus. Daí a importância de uma ampla acção de esclarecimento do Partido com a larga difusão dos documentos de denúncia do massacre de Gaza. Daí a necessidade de dar ainda mais força às acções de solidariedade para com a luta do heróico povo palestiniano, nomeadamente à manifestação convocada para sábado em Lisboa.
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in Avante
Nº 1834
22.Janeiro.2009
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terça-feira, janeiro 20, 2009

Soma e segue - Corte nas reformas

13 Janeiro 2009 - 00h30

Dia a dia

A Segurança Social pública, que se generalizou na Europa depois da II Guerra e em Portugal só chegou no consulado de Marcello Caetano, é uma inegável conquista civilizacional. Quem não sabe o que era viver sem nada depois de uma vida de trabalho pode ler nos ‘Novos Contos da Montanha’, de Miguel Torga, a história de Alma-Grande, o abafador de Trás-os-Montes.
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Contudo, a Segurança Social tem um mecanismo de financiamento que, tecnicamente, é igual ao dos jogos de pirâmide, tal como as burlas de Madoff ou o jogo da bolha. Isto porque as gerações mais novas é que pagam as reformas das gerações mais velhas. Tal como nos esquemas ilegais de p.irâmide, para que tudo funcione é preciso que a base seja alargada para ser superior ao topo.

.A degradação da pirâmide da Segurança Social é causada por boas razões: o aumento da esperança média de vida. As pessoas vivem mais tempo e por isso gastam mais recursos financeiros. Mas como o número de activos a contribuir não aumenta na mesma relação, o bolo é cada vez mais escasso. A solução é cortar nos benefícios dos novos rmados. Todos os anos, a aplicação do factor de sustentabilidade irá reduzir as pensões. As gerações que agora têm 40 ou 50 anos já perdem uma grande fatia. A alternativa para manter o sistema sem cortes era aumentar os impostos.

» ARTIGOS RELACIONADOS

13 Janeiro 2009 - 00h30 Reformas mais baixas

» COMENTÁRIOS

14 Janeiro 2009 - 20h05 | Luis Edgar
Sem uma oposição consistente, o PS tem carta verde para fazer as reformas que quizer! Pena que não as faça

13 Janeiro 2009 - 19h27 | Jacim
Há muitos reformados(além deput, CGD, BdP), que recebem muito + do q descontaram. Paga a população activa(terá reforma?)

13 Janeiro 2009 - 15h23 | Gh
A automatização de quase tudo, retira os empregos as pessoas. Por isso tem que se rever, quem finacia quem.

13 Janeiro 2009 - 15h18 | Gh
O Iva é o imposto mais trasnversal, por isso o mais democrata para ajudar a financiar a Segurança Social.

13 Janeiro 2009 - 15h13 | Gh
O modelo de financiamento da SS é que tem que ser alterado, outras fontes tem que ser encontradas, O Iva é o mais justo.

13 Janeiro 2009 - 14h23 | Luís Filipe
Pois o problema é q deviam atacar as Ref. Milionárias de todos os q passam pelos partidos e 3 anos activo ficam Ricos

13 Janeiro 2009 - 12h59 | Pereira Marques
Ò Armando em ANGOLA teve Segurança Social para sector Privado , niguem fala , Portugal é Padrasto antigos residentes.

13 Janeiro 2009 - 11h49 | A.F.-Londres
A "Alternativa" Justa..e cessarem as Reformas Milionarias e "acumuladas" e Moralizarem a incidente Legislacao Nacional!!

domingo, janeiro 18, 2009

75 anos do 18 de Janeiro de 1934

75 anos do 18 de Janeiro

Sábado, 17 Janeiro 2009

No Comício evocativos dos 75 anos do 18 de Janeiro na Marinha Grande, Jerónimo de Sousa sublinhou a ousadia e a determinação dos revolucionários da memorável jornada de luta de 1934, uma luta que continua a projectar-se nos nossos dias quando cada vez mais se desenvolve uma brutal ofensiva contra os trabalhadores, se limitam os seus direitos e renascem forças fascizantes.

18 de Janeiro de 1934
Sementes de futuro

No dia 18 de Janeiro de 1934, a classe operária e o povo da Marinha Grande tomaram o poder na vila. Nas primeiras horas da madrugada, a estação dos Correios e o posto da GNR foram ocupados e os acessos cortados. A bandeira vermelha ondulou na vila vidreira e foi decretado o soviete. Mas, ao contrário do que esperavam os organizadores do levantamento, o gesto não se repetiu no resto do País e o movimento foi facilmente esmagado pela repressão fascista. Apesar de vencida, a revolta dos operários marinhenses permanece como um exaltante exemplo de heroísmo da classe operária portuguesa, que permanece até aos nossos dias.

O ano de 1934 começou com a entrada em vigor do Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional, que proibia os sindicatos livres. Redigido à imagem da Carta del Lavoro, de Mussolini, o documento previa também a criação de novas organizações – os sindicatos nacionais – subjugados à estrutura corporativa.
Contra mais este passo na construção do Estado fascista em Portugal, as organizações sindicais, dominadas pelas tendências anarco-sindicalistas, convocam para o dia 18 de Janeiro uma greve geral de características insurrecionais com o objectivo de derrubar o governo de Salazar.
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Em algumas localidades, ocorrem greves e manifestações, mas foram facilmente dominadas pelas forças repressivas. Na maior parte dos sítios, a greve geral revolucionária pouco passou de paralisações, acções de sabotagem e confrontos com a polícia. Bento Gonçalves, então Secretário-geral do PCP, designaria o malogrado levantamento de «pura anarqueirada».

O povo tomou o poder

Na Marinha Grande, porém, as coisas passaram-se de forma diferente e os objectivos da insurreição são cumpridos, ainda que por breves horas. No segundo número da série ilegal de O Proletário, órgão da CIS-Comissão Inter-Sindical, editado em meados de 1934, publica-se uma entrevista com «um dos dirigentes do Partido Comunista e do Sindicato Vermelho Vidreiro da Marinha Grande», envolvido no levantamento, que conta como tudo se passou.
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Pelas duas da manhã do dia 18, relata o dirigente, «fizemos a distribuição das nossas forças de choque. Tudo se fez de uma maneira organizada. Os nossos camaradas distinguiam-se por uma braçadeira vermelha com a foice e o martelo. Um grupo numeroso seguiu a cortar as comunicações. Ao mesmo tempo, três outros grupos marchavam a ocupar, simultaneamente, os Paços do Concelho, a estação telegráfica e o quartel da GNR. As armas eram apenas o que se tinha podido arranjar: algumas espingardas caçadeiras, duas pistolas e cinco bombas».
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A resistência dos fascistas limitou-se ao posto da Guarda. Mas nesse momento já todos os outros pontos estratégicos da vila estavam nas mãos dos revoltosos e «toda a massa operária da Marinha Grande estava na rua, apoiando os poucos homens armados que possuíamos». Duas horas de cerco e tiroteio foram suficientes para quebrar a resistência dos polícias, que acabariam por se render. «Às cinco horas da manhã toda a Marinha Grande estava nas mãos do proletariado e milhares de trabalhadores percorriam a vila vitoriando o nosso Partido.»

Repressão e resistência

Sem êxitos semelhantes no resto do País, os operários da Marinha Grande, isolados, viram virar-se contra si toda a fúria repressiva do governo fascista. Segundo o dirigente entrevistado pelo órgão operário, «o governo opunha-nos artilharia, cavalaria, infantaria, metralhadoras e até um avião que já voava sobre a vila para regular o tiro da artilharia».
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Os trabalhadores organizam a retirada para o pinhal. Às 11 horas da manhã, a Marinha Grande é definitivamente tomada pela tropa, que começa a varrer toda a vila, casa a casa, em busca dos dirigentes do levantamento. A reacção do governo salazarista, em particular na Marinha Grande, foi de grande violência e arbitrariedade. Muitos operários são presos e deportados. No seu conjunto, as condenações ultrapassaram os 250 anos de prisão. António Guerra e Augusto Costa morreram no Tarrafal e Francisco da Cruz não resistiu às condições prisionais em Angra do Heroísmo.
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Os estragos provocados pela repressão na organização sindical e partidária na Marinha Grande foram profundos, mas acabaram por ser ultrapassados. Em breve, o Partido tinha reconstruído a sua organização nas principais empresas. A solidariedade com as famílias dos operários presos, que se viram privadas do salário, foi outra coisa que o fascismo não matou. Grupos organizados recolhiam contribuições à saída das fábricas que eram, depois, distribuídas pelas famílias mais carenciadas.

A singularidade da Marinha Grande
Nada foi fruto do acaso

Nos êxitos e fracassos do 18 de Janeiro de 1934, nada foi fruto do acaso. O final dos anos 20 e início dos anos 30 do século XX foram tempos difíceis para a classe operária da Marinha Grande. A grande crise do capitalismo iniciada em 1929 tem efeitos devastadores na indústria vidreira – várias empresas declaram falência e encerram, deixando muitos operários no desemprego.
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Com as empresas encerradas ou em semi-laboração, os vidreiros são enviados para a construção de estradas na zona do Pinhal, em condições duríssimas.
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Mas estes são também anos de intenso combate da classe operária em defesa das suas condições de vida e de trabalho. Como afirmou, em 2004, ao Avante! Joaquim Gomes, «o número de greves e manifestações era espantoso». «Não sei se houve alguma zona do País em que as lutas atingissem o grau que atingiram na Marinha Grande.» (Avante! n.º 1572, de 15 de Janeiro de 2004).
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Eram as greves dos aprendizes, as greves pela unificação das tabelas salariais e por aumentos de salário, pelo fim do trabalho ao domingo, contra o desconto de 2 por cento para o fundo de desemprego ou as greves simultâneas nas empresas de garrafaria em 1931 e 1932. Merecem também destaque as «marchas da fome» e a grande greve de nove meses na Guilherme Pereira Roldão, que culminaria com uma vitória dos operários.
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Ao mesmo tempo, reforçava-se a unidade e organização da classe operária marinhense. As associações sindicais de classe – dos garrafeiros, vidraceiros, cristaleiros e lapidários – unificam-se, dando lugar a uma única organização da indústria vidreira, de âmbito nacional, o Sindicato Nacional dos Trabalhadores da Indústria do Vidro, criado em 1931.
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No plano político, o PCP era já a força determinante junto dos operários vidreiros, ao contrário do que acontecia noutros locais, em que os anarco-sindicalistas tinham ainda posições dominantes. Isto foi possível graças à reorganização do PCP de 1929, liderada por Bento Gonçalves, e ao papel de Manuel Esteves Carvalho, «Manecas», que desenvolveria nesses tempos uma importante actividade de intervenção política e teria uma decisiva acção na unificação do movimento sindical vidreiro, bem como na preparação do levantamento de 18 de Janeiro de 1934 (ver texto).
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Em todas estas lutas, a repressão abateu-se sobre os operários, no sentido de abafar o descontentamento e quebrar o protesto organizado. Muitos foram presos ao longo dos anos e, em 1933, a sede do sindicato acabaria por ser encerrada. É, portanto, um proletariado com tradições combativas e revolucionárias que, na madrugada de 18 de Janeiro, preparou e protagonizou o (breve) assalto dos céus.

Heróis e mártires

É sempre injusto destacar nomes em acções que são, elas próprias, criação das massas populares. Mas não o seria menos deixar no esquecimento os principais organizadores e participantes de um acontecimento tão marcante para a história nacional como foi o 18 de Janeiro de 1934 na Marinha Grande.

Manuel Esteves Carvalho (Manecas)

Nascido em 22 de Fevereiro de 1908 na Marinha Grande, foi marinheiro na Armada. Participante na revolta de 7 de Fevereiro de 1927, foi preso e deportado. Depois de libertado, e no âmbito da reorganização de 1929, regressa à Marinha Grande, onde desenvolve uma intensa actividade partidária, que o leva novamente à prisão, em 1932.
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É com «Manecas» que o PCP implanta na Marinha Grande e a actividade sindical dos vidreiros conhece um novo vigor, que conduziu à sua unificação orgânica. Já muito doente, trabalha como operário na Companhia Industrial Portuguesa e está na preparação e planeamento de toda a acção do 18 de Janeiro. É preso nesse dia e internado do Hospital de Leiria. Viria a falecer no ano seguinte.

José Gregório

Sindicalista e comunista, nasceu em 1908, na Marinha Grande. Operário desde os oito anos, aos 12 participava e dirigia já uma greve de jovens operários da Companhia Industrial Portuguesa por aumentos salariais. Participa em muitas outras lutas e trabalha activamente na unificação do sindicato vidreiro.
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Dirigente do levantamento de 18 de Janeiro, retoma, na clandestinidade, o combate à ditadura. Em 1938, é preso e brutalmente espancado. Libertado em 1940, regressa à luta clandestina e torna-se um dos mais destacados iniciadores da reorganização do Partido de 1940/41.
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Membro do Comité Central e do seu Secretariado, teve um importante papel na direcção do trabalho sindical, que haveria de potenciar o desenvolvimento de grandes lutas operárias. Fez parte do núcleo de direcção do Partido que, até 1952, tem um papel notável na recuperação e defesa do Partido contra os golpes da repressão. Gravemente doente, é enviado para a Checoslováquia, onde morre em 1966.

António Guerra

Nascido a 23 de Junho de 1913, empregado de escritório na fábrica de vidros de Ricardo Santos Galo, encabeça em 1929, com José Gregório, a luta dos vidreiros que construíam as estradas da mata. Fez parte do grupo mais restrito de organizadores do levantamento de 18 de Janeiro, tendo estado no centro de operações, em Casal Galego, na distribuição das tarefas das diversas operações.
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Ele próprio comanda a brigada que tomou a estação de telégrafo e telefones da Marinha Grande, bem como as negociações de rendição do posto da GNR. Membro do PCP com grandes responsabilidades na Região do Oeste, pertencia à direcção do comité da região.
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Preso, violentamente espancado e torturado, foi condenado a 20 anos de degredo. Cumpriu «apenas» 14, entre Angra do Heroísmo e o Tarrafal, onde sofre as mais brutais atrocidades. Quase cego e muito doente, morre no dia 28 de Dezembro de 1948, no Tarrafal. Tinha 35 anos.

Augusto da Costa

Natural de Marrazes, onde nascera em 1901, vai muito jovem para a Marinha Grande com os pais. Por altura do 18 de Janeiro, era oficial vidreiro na Santos Barosa, tendo feito parte da brigada que fez a escolta à guarnição da GNR detida. Foi um dos elementos mais destacados na criação do Sindicato Vidreiro e no desenvolvimento das lutas que se travaram nos primeiros anos da década de 30. Era membro do PCP e responsável pelo comité da empresa onde trabalhava.
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Condenado a cinco anos de desterro, seguiu para Angra do Heroísmo e depois para o Tarrafal, integrando o grupo de 150 presos que inauguram o campo. As terríveis condições, as doenças e a falta de assistência médica conduziram-no à morte, a 22 de Setembro de 1937, onze meses após chegar ao campo.

Manuel Baridó

Nascido em Novembro de 1913, foi um dos mais destacados dirigentes do 18 de Janeiro. Fazia parte da direcção do sindicato em 1933, quando a ditadura mandou encerrar e selar a sua sede. Activista sindical desde muito jovem, era militante do PCP, integrando o Comité Local da Marinha Grande.
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Em 18 de Janeiro, está no centro de operações, em Casal Galego, e participa no assalto ao quartel da GNR e na reabertura da sede do sindicato.
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Foi preso e deportado para Angra do Heroísmo de onde sairia em 1943. Novamente preso em 1961, permanece recluso quase até final da década. A seguir ao 25 de Abril, retomou cargos de direcção política na Marinha Grande, tendo sido eleito nas autarquias e dirigente associativo. Faleceu em 1996.

Adriano Neto Nobre

Natural da Marinha Grande, onde nasceu em Dezembro de 1908, foi membro da direcção do sindicato vidreiro até ao seu encerramento pelo fascismo em 1933. Perseguido, esteve em Espanha, de onde regressa com José Gregório para se juntarem ao colectivo de direcção e organização do movimento do 18 de Janeiro. Membro do PCP, assumiu responsabilidades no comité regional do Oeste.
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Preso na sequência do 18 de Janeiro, foi deportado para Angra do Heroísmo, tendo sido libertado em 1940. Foi novamente preso em 1949. Com o 25 de Abril continuou activo na vida política da Marinha Grande.

Francisco da Cruz (Cobra-morta)

Operário vidreiro nascido em 1908, integrou a brigada que tomou o quartel da GNR na Marinha Grande. Preso no dia 18 de Janeiro, enfrentou a polícia com grande coragem, tendo sido alvo de um brutal e desumano interrogatório. Preso no presídio da Trafaria, seria depois enviado para Angra do Heroísmo, onde viria a morrer em Junho de 1936, vítima de espancamentos e maus tratos.

Pedro Amarante Mendes

Alfaiate de 24 anos, integrava o Comité Local do PCP. Participante activo na direcção do movimento, teve uma intervenção destacada no assalto ao quartel da GNR. Julgado à revelia em 1938, foi condenado a 24 meses de prisão.

José Domingos

Operário vidreiro de 21 anos, natural da Marinha Grande, foi um dos responsáveis operacionais do 18 de Janeiro. Chefiou a brigada do Valeirão, que bloqueou a estrada Leiria-Marinha Grande e destruiu as ligações telefónicas. Fez a escolta à guarnição da GNR. Preso a 26 de Janeiro, foi condenado a seis anos de desterro.

Álvaro André

Natural da Marinha Grande, operário vidreiro, foi um dos responsáveis operacionais do levantamento, tendo dirigido uma das brigadas. Preso, foi condenado a 12 anos de degredo.

Declaração do PCP sobre o 18 de Janeiro
Tomar o mundo nas mãos

A Direcção da Organização Regional de Leiria do PCP emitiu, esta semana, uma declaração política acerca do 75.º aniversário da Greve Geral Revolucionária de 18 de Janeiro de 1934, que reproduzimos na íntegra (os subtítulos são da responsabilidade da redacção).

«À classe operária, aos trabalhadores, ao povo da Marinha Grande.
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«Setenta cinco anos depois, a jornada heróica do proletariado vidreiro da Marinha Grande permanece como um marco importante na luta abnegada e combativa dos trabalhadores portugueses pela liberdade e a democracia, contra a exploração, por uma vida digna e com direitos, e em defesa das suas organizações de classe.
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«Há setenta cinco anos coube à classe operária da Marinha Grande, e em particular ao proletariado vidreiro, desempenhar o papel determinante nessa grande e corajosa jornada contra o fascismo. O movimento do 18 de Janeiro de 1934 mostrou quão ilusória e falsa era a propaganda fascista de um Portugal pacificado e identificado há ditadura fascista.
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«Comemorando este importante acontecimento histórico, a Direcção Regional de Leiria do PCP salienta o destacado papel que a organização comunista na Marinha Grande desempenhou na preparação, direcção e realização deste generoso acto revolucionário. A vincada cultura e concentração operária, a experiência de luta adquirida ao longo de anos, a forte compreensão sobre o que o fascismo representava, a existência de uma forte organização sindical e de uma organização local do PCP coesa e profundamente ligada aos trabalhadores, determinaram que os operários vidreiros e o povo marinhense ousassem tentar – sob a direcção do Partido – tomar nas suas mãos a construção de um futuro de progresso, paz e justiça social.

Audácia paga com lágrimas de sangue

«A classe operária, os trabalhadores e o povo da Marinha Grande declararam a constituição do “soviete”, e, ainda que só por algumas horas, foram donos dos seus destinos. Tal facto constitui uma experiência inolvidável na luta de resistência contra o fascismo que o povo português travou durante 48 anos.
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«É certo que o povo da Marinha Grande pagou com enormes sacrifícios tamanha audácia. Mais de uma centena de entre os melhores filhos do povo desta terra foram presos, torturados, exilados e alguns foram mesmo assassinados pelo execrável regime fascista. É necessário lembrar que dos 152 presos políticos que foram inaugurar o Campo de Concentração do Tarrafal – o Campo da Morte Lenta – 57 deles tinham participado no 18 de Janeiro e, destes, vários operários eram marinhenses.
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«Apesar da feroz repressão, a influência do Partido na classe operária e no povo, o prosseguimento da acção sindical, o exemplo de firmeza, abnegação e de luta por um Portugal melhor criaram raízes profundas que perduram até hoje.
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«Como disse Álvaro Cunhal, a “Marinha Grande é um nome escrito a ouro na história do movimento operário português. Melhor se pode dizer: escrito com lágrimas e sangue”. A Marinha Grande “pode orgulhar-se de muitos combatentes de vanguarda que tem dado ao movimento operário. Pode orgulhar-se dos seus mártires e dos seus heróis”.

A actualidade de um combate

«Saudando esses heróicos combatentes e todo o povo da Marinha Grande, a Direcção Regional de Leiria do PCP releva o facto de, 75 anos decorridos, vários dos objectivos que motivaram a Greve Geral Revolucionária em 18 de Janeiro de 1934 manterem grande actualidade.
«Hoje, vive-se um tempo em que sistema capitalista enfrenta uma das suas maiores crises, em que de novo o poder económico domina o poder político, em que a fome e a miséria alastram, um tempo em que se desenvolve um brutal ataque contra os direitos dos trabalhadores, os seus salários e pensões, em que se que agrava a exploração, em o desemprego atinge números preocupantes e tudo fazem no plano político e legislativo para fragilizar o movimento sindical de classe.
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«Mas vive-se igualmente um tempo de alargamento da consciência de classe, da compreensão da unidade, da luta, da resistência dos trabalhadores e do povo, e do reforço do PCP. Estes são, como há 75 anos atrás elementos centrais da luta pela ruptura com a política de direita e a criação de uma política alternativa e uma alternativa política, no caminho de uma democracia avançada no limiar do século XXI, do socialismo e do comunismo.
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«Viva o 18 de Janeiro de 1934! Viva a classe operária, os trabalhadores e o povo da Marinha Grande! A luta continua!»
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In Avante 2009.01.15
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sexta-feira, janeiro 16, 2009

«Agressão sionista já matou mais de 900 palestinianos»

MiguelUrbanoRodrigues
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Desafio neonazi sionista à humanidade
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O genocídio do povo de Gaza

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Escrevo no momento em que está em desenvolvimento a escalada genocida do Estado sionista de Israel contra o povo de Gaza.Essa bárbara operação exterminista – apoiada pela esmagadora maioria dos israelenses e incentivada pelo sistema de poder dos EUA com a cumplicidade da maioria dos governos da União Europeia – é acompanhada de uma ambiciosa e massacrante ofensiva mediática de âmbito mundial que deforma a História e pretende justificar o crime com o argumento de que Israel exerce o direito de defesa para proteger as suas populações e sobreviver como nação.Estamos perante uma daquelas tragédias em que as palavras são insuficientes – como aconteceu com as chacinas do III Reich alemão – para qualificar as proporções e o significado do crime.A desinformação, garantida pelo controlo hegemónico dos grandes media, dificulta extraordinariamente o esclarecimento dos povos porque a vítima é apresentada como agressor e este como representante de valores inalienáveis da democracia.A primeira e fundamental mentira é a que responsabiliza o Hamas pelo rompimento da trégua. Israel, ao iniciar o bombardeamento aéreo e naval seguido da invasão terrestre, estaria a proteger as populações das suas cidades e aldeias atingidas por rockets palestinianos.Trata-se de uma grosseira inverdade.Existe uma abundante documentação secreta do próprio Ministério da Defesa israelense que demonstra com clareza a premeditação do crime pelo governo de Telavive.Encontramos uma síntese de factos relacionados com essa premeditação num importante artigo do professor canadiano Michel Chossudovsky, da Universidade de Otawa.Nesse texto (divulgado por globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=2009) o prestigiado economista e escritor lembra que a «operação chumbo fundido» foi minuciosamente planeada com seis meses de antecedência, quando Israel iniciava a negociação de um acordo de cessar fogo com o Hamas. O projecto foi, porém, concebido em 2001.A 4 de Novembro pp., dia das eleições presidenciais dos EUA, Israel aliás rompeu a trégua, bombardeando a Faixa de Gaza, alegando a necessidade de impedir a construção de túneis pelos palestinos.Chossudovsky chama a atenção para o facto de, transcorridas 24 horas, a 5 de Novembro, o governo de Telavive ter iniciado o monstruoso bloqueio de Gaza, cortando o abastecimento à Faixa de alimentos, combustível e medicamentos. Posteriormente o exército israelense realizou numerosas incursões armadas no território de Gaza.O Hamas, em legítima defesa, respondeu com o lançamento de rockets de fabrico caseiro. Não há mentiras e calúnias que possam apagar a evidência: 13 israelenses morreram desde então em consequência do disparo de rockets do Hamas, mas a agressão sionista é responsável pela morte de mais de 900 palestinos, superando 4 mil o número de feridos.Gaza, um cenário de apocalipseAs notícias que chegam de Gaza e as imagens transmitidas pela televisão iluminam um cenário de apocalipse: quarteirões inteiros arrasados, mesquitas bombardeadas na hora da oração, hospitais e universidades destruídos. Crianças e mulheres ensanguentadas movendo-se entre ruínas, corpos humanos esfacelados. Em Gaza acabou o pão, bairros inteiros estão privados de electricidade e água. Mas a monstruosidade do genocídio merece o apoio de Washington. O presidente Bush justifica-o em nome da democracia, tal como a sente. Mais: impede que o Conselho de Segurança aprove uma Resolução que imponha o cessar fogo [n.d.r.: entretanto, o CS da ONU aprovou, quinta-feira, dia 8, a Resolução 1860 por 14 votos a favor e uma abstenção, dos EUA].A atitude prevalecente nos governos da União Europeia é de hipocrisia e cinismo. Afirmam desejar um cessar fogo, alguns definem como «desproporcionada a resposta de Israel», mas manifestam compreensão pela sua «reacção defensiva» contra «os terroristas do Hamas».A Rússia e a China condenam a escalada de violência que atinge Gaza, mas a sua atitude carece de firmeza no Conselho de Segurança. Os povos árabes saem massivamente às ruas para expressar a sua condenação da matança de Gaza. Mas diferente é a posição assumida pelos governos da maioria dos países árabes. Os seus governantes comportam-se como cúmplices envergonhados de Telelavie.Sarkozy, a chanceler Merkel, Berlusconi, Brown, Durão Barroso trocam sorrisos e amabilidades com Olmert e a ministra Livni. Hipócrita e covarde é também a postura assumida pelo presidente da Autoridade Nacional Palestiniana. Mahmud Abbas pede um cessar fogo, mas responsabilizou inicialmente os seus compatriotas do Hamas pela escalada de violência. Na cobertura da agressão israelense pelos meios de comunicação dos EUA e da União Europeia identifico um retrato chocante do jornalismo mercenário.Os enviados especiais, com poucas excepções, limitam-se a transmitir as declarações dos ministros e dos militares de Israel. As imagens de casas atingidas nas cidades judaicas fronteiriças ocupam em algumas reportagens quase tanto espaço e tempo como as do inferno em que Gaza foi transformada pelos bombardeamentos israelenses. Nos media portugueses de referência a satanização do Hamas tornou-se rotineira. Editores, analistas, apresentadores, enviados especiais competem na repetição monocórdica do «direito de defesa de Israel» contra o terrorismo. De Washington a Paris passou também a ser quase obrigatória a responsabilização do Irão pela resistência heróica dos milicianos do Hamas. A extrema direita estado-unidense, sobretudo, não esconde o seu desejo de que a barbárie que abrasa Gaza seja o prólogo de uma tragédia maior que envolva o Irão, berço de uma das maiores civilizações criadas pela humanidade. O apocalipse de Gaza transmite uma lição assustadora: a barbárie do Estado sionista de Israel, apoiada pelo imperialismo estadounidense e contemplada compreensivamente pelos seus aliados da União Europeia configura uma ameaça à civilização.Num contexto histórico muito diferente, as burguesias do Ocidente trazem à memoria a atmosfera europeia nas vésperas de Munique. Afirmam a sua fidelidade aos valores da democracia tal como a concebem, mas actuam como cúmplices de um Estado cuja política os nega e espezinha ao promover chacinas como a de Gaza.A solidariedade de todos os homens e mulheres progressistas com o heróico povo da Palestina martirizada é mais do que nunca um dever.Nestes dias os combatentes do Hamas, ao lutarem pelo direito do seu povo a ser livre e independente, batem-se, afinal, por valores eternos.O genocídio de Gaza é um desafio do sionismo NEONAZI à Humanidade.
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Outros Títulos:• Povo colhe benefícios da revolução• Combater a repressão• Milhões sem emprego nos EUA• Assassinados dois militantes do FMLN• Esquadrões da morte• Justiça persegue Zuma

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in Avante 2009.01.15
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ver http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestina
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